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ABSTRACT
Metacognitive thinking, a methodology for mastering intellectually
challenging material, is revolutionizing legal education. Metacognition empowers people to increase their mental capabilities by discovering and correcting flaws in their thinking processes. For decades,
legal educators have employed metacognitive strategies in specialized
areas of the curriculum. Today, metacognition has the potential to
transform legal education curriculum-wide.
Current scholarship is rich, generous, and creative in exploring how
metacognition can be used to enrich specific sectors of the law curriculum. What is missing, however, is a holistic examination of how metacognitive theory and practice have developed across these different
sectors, with the purpose of improving the theoretical framework and
increasing its effectiveness. This Article comprehensively reviews the
many facets of the metacognitive revolution, drawing parallels for the
first time between experiential and non-experiential pedagogies and
further relating them to recent accreditation mandates. It then addresses the likelihood that an important phase of the metacognitive
revolution—the mandate to implement formative assessments with
meaningful feedback—might be widely but poorly implemented, and
thus cause more harm than benefit. To mitigate this problem, the Article suggests two new ways of conceptualizing what constitutes
“meaningful feedback.” The first is that for feedback to be meaningful,
it must be accompanied by metacognitive reflection. The second is that
feedback takes on meaning when prefaced by the deconstruction and
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abstraction, or “naming,” of legal thinking processes. Both insights
emerge only upon a holistic examination of metacognitive theory and
practice as they have developed across disparate sectors of the legal
curriculum.
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INTRODUCTION
A revolution is afoot in legal education that is both momentous and misunderstood. Metacognitive thinking, an intellectual strategy for mastering complex material that focuses on
planning, performance, self-reflection, and self-correction, is
dramatically reshaping the law curriculum. Metacognitive theory is supported by decades of research1 and holds great promise to improve core legal competencies and to enhance good
judgment, intelligence, lifelong learning skills, and mental
health.2 Metacognitive techniques have long been employed in
pedagogies focused on legal writing, experiential learning,
some first-year courses, and other curricular specialties, and
their growing influence is demonstrated by the recent accreditation mandate to use formative assessments (that is, midcourse evaluation tools) throughout the curriculum.3 This mandate has the potential to broadly transform legal education.
However, the theoretical framework for metacognition in legal
education is incompletely developed, which may cause this
phase of the metacognitive revolution to ultimately fail in its
goals. To address this vulnerability, this article undertakes a holistic examination of metacognitive theory and practice across
different sectors of the law curriculum, with the aim of discovering guiding principles for the effective use of metacognition
in legal education. The article highlights a number of these
guiding principles, including two new approaches to the formative assessment mandate.4
Metacognitive theory holds that human performance improves when people strategically plan and reflect on past
1. See, e.g., Michael Hunter Schwartz, Teaching Law Students to Be Self- Regulated Learners,
2003 MICH. ST. DCL L. REV. 447 (2003) [hereinafter Schwartz I] (detailing extensive studies in
the effectiveness of self-learning curriculums for law school instruction); see also Cheryl B. Preston et al., Teaching “Thinking Like a Lawyer”: Metacognition and Law Students, 2014 BYU L. REV.
1053, 1062 (2015); Anthony Niedwiecki, Teaching for Lifelong Learning: Improving the Metacognitive Skills of Law Students Through More Effective Formative Assessment Techniques, 40 CAP. U. L.
REV. 149, 150 (2012) [hereinafter Niedwiecki I].
2. See infra Part II.
3. See infra Section I.D.2.
4. See infra Part III.
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experiences in order to improve future performance. 5 The fundamental idea is that people learn, think, and perform more effectively when they deliberately map out their intellectual
choices, evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of their thinking
processes, and purposefully adjust those thought patterns in
ways intended to improve their outcomes.6 The metacognitive
thinker masters material more deeply and more efficiently, develops a lifelong ability to conquer new problems, improves her
judgment, and even increases her intelligence.7 In short, if a
metaphorical road represented a person’s learning trajectory,
with a starting line marked “novice” and a finish line marked
“mastery,” the metacognitive approach shortens the length of
that road.8
The metacognitive approach holds great promise to enhance
every person’s intellectual capacity, regardless of her prior academic credentials or skill levels. Metacognition can enhance any
type of legal expertise, whether the goal is to understand the
Erie doctrine or the business judgment rule; conquer the traditional issue-spotting exam; craft an opening statement for a
jury; or explore how the law interacts with other societal forces.
Metacognitive theory has been used in a growing number of
contexts within the legal academy, including traditional doctrinal courses,9 a first-year class devoted to legal reasoning and
self-regulated learning,10 legal research and writing courses,11
5.
6.
7.
8.

See infra Section I.A.
See infra Section II.A.
See infra Section II.A.
Barbara Lentz, Incorporating Reflection into Law Teaching and Learning, in EXPERIENTIAL
EDUCATION IN THE LAW SCHOOL CURRICULUM 17, 18–21 (Emily Grant, Sandra Simpson & Kelly
Terry eds., 2018); see also, e.g., E. Scott Fruehwald, How to Help Students from Disadvantaged Backgrounds Succeed in Law School, 1 TEX. A&M L. REV. 83, 107 (2013) (explaining that students who
are not taught metacognitive thinking skills are less efficient learners than students who have
those skills).
9. See, e.g., Carol Springer Sargent & Andrea A. Curcio, Empirical Evidence That Formative
Assessments Improve Final Exams, 61 J. LEGAL EDUC. 379, 384 (2012).
10. See Schwartz I, supra note 1, at 484.
11. See, e.g., Anthony S. Niedwiecki, Lawyers and Learning: A Metacognitive Approach to Legal
Education, 13 WIDENER L. REV. 33, 54 (2006) [hereinafter Niedwiecki II]; Nancy Millich, Building
Blocks of Analysis: Using Simple “Sesame Street Skills” and Sophisticated Educational Learning
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experiential classes,12 legal ethics,13 academic support,14 professional and moral identity development,15 and in the context of
teaching methods focused specifically on millennials,16 the
problem method,17 and students from disadvantaged backgrounds.18 Metacognition’s influence is so broad that many of
its principles are now embedded into the American Bar Association (ABA)’s accreditation standards.19
What makes the metacognitive approach “revolutionary”?
Understanding its significance requires a brief look at what the
revolution is upending. For nearly 150 years, the primary methodology for legal education has been the Langdellian case
Theories in Teaching a Seminar in Legal Analysis and Writing, 34 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1127, 1128
(1994); Kristina L. Niedringhaus, Teaching Better Research Skills by Teaching Metacognitive Ability,
18 PERSPECTIVES: TEACHING LEGAL RESEARCH AND WRITING 113, 113 (2010).
12. See infra Section I.E. This article employs the terms “experiential” and “non-experiential”
merely for convenience, with the former referring to clinical, externship, and simulation
courses. See AM. BAR ASS’N, STANDARDS AND RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW
SCHOOLS 2018–2019 § 304(a) (2018) [hereinafter 2018–2019 ABA STANDARDS]. For an analysis of
the intellectual incoherence of such labels “doctrine” vs. “skills” courses and their harmful effects, see Linda H. Edwards, The Trouble with Categories: What Theory Can Teach Us About the
Doctrine-Skills Divide, 64 J. LEGAL EDUC. 181, 210–27 (2014); see also Margaret Martin Barry, Jon
C. Dubin & Peter A. Joy, Clinical Education for This Millennium: The Third Wave, 7 CLINICAL L.
REV. 1, 27–30 (2000) (discussing how the divide between “experiential” and other courses often
determines faculty status and compensation, which in turn affects how academic institutions
are governed).
13. See, e.g., Filippa M. Anzalone, Education for the Law: Reflective Education for the Law, in
HANDBOOK OF REFLECTION AND REFLECTIVE INQUIRY: MAPPING A WAY OF KNOWING FOR
PROFESSIONAL REFLECTIVE INQUIRY 85, 93 n.53 (Nona Lyons ed., 2000).
14. See, e.g., Louis N. Schulze, Jr., Using Science to Build Better Learners: One School’s Successful
Efforts to Raise Its Bar Passage Rates in an Era of Decline, 68 J. LEGAL EDUC. 230, 231–32 (2019).
15. See, e.g., E. Scott Fruehwald, Developing Law Students’ Professional Identities, 37 U. LA
VERNE L. REV. 1, 5 (2015); Christine Cerniglia Brown, Professional Identity Formation: Working
Backwards to Move the Profession Forward, 61 LOY. L. REV. 313, 317 (2015); Timothy Casey, Reflective Practice in Legal Education: The Stages of Reflection, 20 CLINICAL L. REV. 317, 348–50 (2014).
16. See, e.g., Renee Nicole Allen & Alicia R. Jackson, Contemporary Teaching Strategies: Effectively Engaging Millennials Across the Curriculum, 95 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 1, 15–16 (2017); Ruth
Vance & Susan Stuart, Of Moby Dick & Tartar Sauce: The Academically Underprepared Law Student
& the Curse of Overconfidence, 53 DUQ. L. REV. 133, 148–61 (2015); Shailini Jandial George, Teaching the Smartphone Generation: How Cognitive Science Can Improve Learning in Law School, 66 ME.
L. REV. 163, 180–82 (2013); Jason S. Palmer, ”The Millennials Are Coming!”: Improving Self-Efficacy
in Law Students Through Universal Design in Learning, 63 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 675, 696–99 (2015).
17. See Shirley Lung, The Problem Method: No Simple Solution, 45 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 723,
758–59 (2009).
18. See Fruehwald, supra note 8, at 114–15.
19. See infra Section II.D.
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method, which dissects judicial opinions in order to deduct universal legal principles,20 coupled with Socratic questioning techniques. Critics of these traditional methods argue that they not
only teach the wrong material,21 but also that they teach it
poorly.22 Professor Michael Hunter Schwartz critiques the Socratic method as expecting students to “self-teach”23 and to
learn “vicariously,”24 in that
law professors structure classroom interactions as
one-on-one, professor-on-student dialogues. Professors expect that the other students in the classes will learn by watching these interactions . . . .
Vicarious instruction assumes some sort of rebound learning effect; somehow the professor’s
comments, questions, and corrections of the selected student not only will help the selected student, but will rub off on all the students in the
class. This method also presupposes that the non20. See, e.g., Robert Rubinson, The Holmes School of Law: A Proposal to Reform Legal Education
Through Realism, 35 B.C. J.L. & SOC. JUST. 33, 48 (2015).
21. For instance, a primary critique of the Langdellian method argues it fails to teach practical skills as well as “ways of thinking within and about the role of lawyers—methods of critical
analysis, planning, and decision-making,” and thus inadequately prepares students for the
practice of law. See Barry et al., supra note 12, at 34.
22. See e.g., Sheila I. Vélez Martínez, Towards an Outcrit Pedagogy of Anti-Subordination in the
Classroom, 90 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 585, 593 (“A long line of articles and reports by scholars, foundations, and ABA special committees has consistently highlighted the need for pedagogical diversification in law school.”); see also Rubinson, supra note 20, at 49.
23. Michael Hunter Schwartz, Teaching Law by Design: How Learning Theory & Instructional
Design Can Inform & Reform Law Teaching, 38 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 347, 350 (2001) [hereinafter
Schwartz II].
24. Id. at 351. For a similar critique of the Socratic method as “implicit teaching,” see Niedwiecki II, supra note 11, at 33–34 (“Most professors probably believe that [Socratic] instruction
helps students to ‘think like a lawyer,’ with the goal being that the students will eventually ask
themselves similar questions when they analyze cases on their own . . . . [In reality, t]his often
prevents a student from being able to fully transfer the in-class experience to new situations
[because] the purpose of the questioning is never explicitly explained to the students, and there
is generally no questioning that delves into the explicit thought processes of the students.” (emphasis added)). See also Martínez, supra note 22, at 591 (noting that the Socratic method, as implemented by many law faculty, omits the important act of engaging students in knowledge
production); Lentz, supra note 8, at 27 (explaining that as implemented, Socratic dialogue is
merely questions, but without reflection or learning). For a defense of traditional law teaching
methods, see Gary Shaw, A Heretical View of Teaching: A Contrarian Looks at Teaching, the Carnegie
Report, & Best Practices, 28 TOURO L. REV. 1239 (2012).
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selected students know to play along, answering
the queries in their heads and learning to think
like lawyers by experiencing vicariously what the
speaking student actually experiences.25
Schwartz likens this traditional law classroom experience to
trying to learn how to swim by watching other people jump in
a pool one-by-one and try to swim with no prior training.26 He
contrasts this method with proper swim lessons that provide
explicit instruction on successful kicking and breathing techniques and offer every student ample personal time in the pool
to practice, get feedback, and work on improving their skills.27
Schwartz’s analogy demonstrates why frequently-recommended reforms for legal education include clearer instruction,
more opportunities for evaluation and feedback, and more engaged learning methodologies, through which students do not
seek to learn passively but instead actively participate in generating their own knowledge.28 All of these reforms are part of the
metacognitive approach.
Critics of traditional law teaching methods also point out that
those methods have never been proven effective,29 unlike the
metacognitive approach, which is backed by decades of research. Professor Schwartz notes that hundreds of studies link

25. See Schwartz II, supra note 23, at 351.
26. Id. at 354–55.
27. Id. at 356.
28. See id. at 376, 380. For discussions of passive learning, see Elizabeth M. Bloom, A Law
School Game Changer: (Trans)formative Feedback, 41 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 227, 236–37 (2015) (discussing the passive role that students play by merely receiving feedback rather than taking a participatory role in the feedback process) [hereinafter Bloom I]; Carolyn Grose, Beyond Skills Training, Revisited: The Clinical Education Spiral, 19 CLINICAL L. REV. 489, 494–95 (2013) (discussing the
passive “‘banking concept of education’ where students are seen as empty vessels into which
teachers pour their knowledge” (quoting William P. Quigley, Introduction to Clinical Teaching for
the New Clinical Law Professor: A View from the First Floor, 28 AKRON L. REV. 463, 474 (1995))).
29. See, e.g., Andrea A. Curcio, Gregory Todd Jones & Tanya M. Washington, Does Practice
Make Perfect? An Empirical Examination of the Impact of Practice Essays on Essay Exam Performance,
35 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 271, 272–74 (2008) (discussing the lack of empirical evidence behind traditional legal pedagogy); Martínez, supra note 22, at 595 (arguing that the effectiveness of the casedialogue method has “never been demonstrated”).
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aspects of metacognition to better educational outcomes,30 and
he and other scholars have also connected it to other learning
theories, including cognitivism (focusing on how the brain processes and stores learning)31, constructivism (emphasizing the
learner’s personal experience and the active construction and
negotiation of meaning),32 social cognitivism (exploring the relationship of learning and social interactions),33 experiential
learning theory,34 transfer theory, 35 and andragogical theory (focusing specifically on how adults learn).36
Educational experts in other disciplines have long embraced
metacognition37 and there is good reason that legal experts are
now exploring it. The metacognitive approach trains thinkers to
not only more deeply and efficiently master core legal skills, but
it also especially succeeds in developing the ability to transfer
learning from one context to another.38 This is especially useful
for legal thinking, which requires that abstract, complex concepts be transferred to an endless variety of new contexts in
ways that are highly flexible and creative, yet also retain
30. For an extensive review of the literature, see Schwartz I, supra note 1, at 472–86. See also
Preston et al., supra note 1, at 1062 (noting that metacognition is regularly covered in general
education and educational psychology textbooks, handbooks, and journals and “has become an
extremely important concept in education scholarship”); Margaret Y. K. Woo & Jeremy R.
Paul, From the Editors, 65 J. LEGAL EDUC. 705, 705–06 (2016) (introducing the 2016 volume of the
Journal of Legal Education dedicated almost exclusively to the topic of metacognition).
31. E.g., Schwartz II, supra note 23, at 371–72; Schwartz I, supra note 1, at 454.
32. E.g., Schwartz II, supra note 23, at 380; Schwartz I, supra note 1, at 454.
33. E.g., Elizabeth M. Bloom, Teaching Law Students to Teach Themselves: Using Lessons from
Educational Psychology to Shape Self-Regulated Learners, 59 WAYNE L. REV. 311, 316 (2013) [hereinafter Bloom II].
34. See Lentz, supra note 8, at 28; see also infra Section I.E.
35. See, e.g., Tonya Kowalski, True North: Navigating for the Transfer of Learning in Legal Education, 34 SEATTLE U.L. REV. 51, 52–53 (2010).
36. See, e.g., Frank Bloch, The Andragogical Basis for Clinical Legal Education, 35 VAND. L. REV.
321, 327 (1982) (citing psychologist Malcolm Knowles); Casey, supra note 15, at 328–31 (discussing other learning theories used to explain behavior observed in the clinical classroom that was
not addressed by Bloch’s thesis); Niedwiecki II, supra note 11, at 47.
37. See, e.g., Niedwiecki II, supra note 11, at 35 (Metacognition is “widely accepted and universally applied in many educational environments.”); see also Preston et al., supra note 1, at
1062. The classic learning taxonomy produced by Benjamin Bloom, commonly referred to as
“Bloom’s Taxonomy,” was revised in 2001 to include metacognition. Allen & Jackson, supra note
16, at 25.
38. See infra Section II.A.3.
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analytical integrity.39 Metacognition training holds significant
promise to foster greater excellence in legal thought, increase
bar passage rates, heighten satisfaction among clients and employers, as well as to increase personal motivation, engagement, and mental health among law students and practitioners.40
For all of these reasons, the metacognition revolution is
changing what law schools teach and how they teach it. Recent
scholarship is brimming with creative, well-designed proposals
that are carefully grounded in both learning theory and experience and that generously share insight into how metacognition
can be applied to legal studies.41 Much work remains to be done,
however, to fully understand how metacognition is best applied in the context of legal thinking.
What is missing from the current body of literature is a holistic analysis of metacognitive theory and practice across different sectors of the law curriculum, with the purpose of revealing
points of weakness and ways to correct them. This Article undertakes this project. The next two parts of this Article explain
the metacognitive approach, demonstrate how broadly and
deeply it is embedded into the legal curriculum, and discuss its
importance. Part I details the steps in metacognitive thinking
and illustrates how this approach has been used in courses for
first-year students, legal writing, and experiential education,
among others, and explains how industry-wide reform efforts
also embrace elements of the metacognitive approach. Part II
then explains how the metacognitive approach benefits legal
education, drawing on learning and educational psychology
theory to explain its power to improve the quality of legal thinking and the mental health of law students and lawyers.
Part III examines how the spreading influence of metacognition also carries risks, and how these risks can be addressed. In
39. See infra Section II.A.3.
40. See infra Section II.B.
41. See, e.g., Schwartz II, supra note 23, at 383–84. Literature cited throughout this article contains many concrete examples of metacognitive techniques.
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particular, the ABA now requires law schools to incorporate a
fundamental component of the metacognitive approach, formative assessment with meaningful feedback, throughout the entire curriculum.42 This presents an opportunity for broad curricular transformation based on metacognitive principles. An
inadequate understanding of what constitutes “meaningful
feedback,” however, may severely undermine the effectiveness
of the ABA mandate.
Current literature seeks to cure this limitation primarily by
improving the type and form of feedback provided, particularly
with respect to the use of “model” answers in connection with
traditional midterm issue-spotting exams.43 This is an appropriate and necessary response. This article proposes, however, two
new ways to conceptualize what meaningful feedback is. First,
it argues that improved feedback techniques must be more deliberately selected with metacognitive purposes in mind, and
that second, that better feedback must also be accompanied by
another metacognitive strategy: the deconstruction and abstraction, or “naming,” of legal thinking processes. These two proposals are intended to prevent weak implementation of the
meaningful-feedback mandate and to maximize the benefits of
the metacognitive revolution.
I. THE METACOGNITIVE REVOLUTION AND ITS COMPONENTS
This section explains the metacognitive approach and provides concrete examples of how it is currently implemented in
the law school curriculum. It further discusses how metacognitive principles were embraced by influential curricular reform
proposals published decades ago, and how these principles today are reflected in accreditation standards set by the ABA. This
discussion highlights core principles reflected in the many different components of the metacognitive revolution, including
courses focused on first-year students, experiential learning,
42. 2018–2019 ABA STANDARDS, supra note 12, § 303(a)(3).
43. See, e.g., Bloom I, supra note 28, at 242.
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and legal writing. In addition, since this is one of very few articles to meaningfully incorporate clinical theory and practice
into discussions about metacognition, this section closes with a
brief review of the close alignment between clinical theory and
metacognitive theory.
A. The Metacognitive Approach
Broadly speaking, “[c]ognition is the way in which we think
about, approach, obtain, and process information. Metacognition is the study of how we cognate.”44 Metacognition requires
a person to closely examine how she personally approaches an
intellectually challenging situation, and to strategically alter her
thinking patterns and behavior in order to increase their effectiveness.45 A person with strong metacognitive skills actively
defines her intellectual goal; plans out strategies for achieving
the goal; attempts to implement those strategies; monitors
whether her attempt was successful or not; identifies flaws in
her thinking and behavior that hampered her success; and adjusts her thought processes and actions in order to improve her
outcome next time.46 In sum, metacognition “refers to the processes used to plan, monitor, and assess one’s understanding
and performance,”47 and to consciously alter one’s thinking and
behavior, to better succeed at the task at hand.
How does a metacognitive thinker gain such an acute level of
self-awareness and successfully channel it into intellectual selfimprovement? A review of the literature focused on the context
of legal education reveals a twelve-step process that this article
refers to as “the metacognitive approach.”48 When faced with an
44. Paula Lustbader, Construction Sites, Building Types, and Bridging Gaps: A Cognitive Theory
of the Learning Progression of Law Students, 33 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 315, 324 (1997).
45. Allen & Jackson, supra note 16, at 14.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. The term “metacognition” has been defined in many ways, and its meaning continues
to evolve. E.g., Robin A. Boyle, Employing Active-Learning Techniques & Metacognition in Law
School: Shifting Energy from Professor to Student, 81 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 1, 8 (2003); Patti Alleva
& Jennifer A. Gundlach, Learning Intentionally and the Metacognitive Task, 65 J. LEGAL EDUC. 710,
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intellectual task—such as reading or briefing a case, taking a
midterm, writing a motion, or meeting with a client49—a strong
metacognitive thinker does the following:
1. Identifies the goals or desired outcomes of the upcoming activity;50
2. Identifies what resources she already possesses
that may help her achieve those goals, along with
when and how to use these resources. Resources
can include prior personal knowledge and experiences, intellectual and emotional skills,51 and
techniques for achieving personal productivity;52
3. Identifies additional resources that may help her
achieve the goals, but that she does not yet possess; and identifies how to access those resources,
and when and how to use them;

714 n.14, 722 (2016); Niedwiecki I, supra note 1, at 155. The twelve steps of the metacognitive
approach, as outlined above, are extrapolated from various sources that define the subsets of
the metacognitive or self-regulated learning processes. The twelve-step process articulated
above organizes these many components into a single list. See, e.g., DENISE RIEBE & MICHAEL
HUNTER SCHWARTZ, PASS THE BAR!, 78–80 (2006); Schwartz I, supra note 1, at 452; Casey, supra
note 15, at 322; Preston et al., supra note 1, at 1058; Bloom II, supra note 33, at 313, 316–17; Niedwiecki II, supra note 11, 41–44.
49. While the performance of legal skills or tasks is viewed by some as only occurring in
experiential or legal research and writing experiences, the metacognitive approach views any
performance of a component of legal analysis as an experience from which one can learn. This
includes the performance of tasks during, or in preparation for, a non-experiential course, such
as pre-class reading, case briefing, participating in class dialogue, studying for quizzes or exams, taking an exam, etc. See, e.g., Schwartz II, supra note 23 (applying the metacognitive approach to many facets of law school performance to teach students how to become self-regulated learners).
50. See Schwartz I supra note 1, at 453.
51. Examples of emotional skills include the ability to stay motivated, and the ability to combat feelings that may hinder progress toward the goal, such as frustration, anxiety, or boredom.
See Schwartz I, supra note 1, at 456, 459. “[L]earning involves not only cognition and metacognition, but an affective aspect as well. Deep thinking about one’s own thinking necessarily implicates awareness and monitoring of thoughts and emotions. Correspondingly, teaching that
does not engage the affective ‘may result in relatively incomplete, temporary, and unsophisticated learning.’” Alleva & Gundlach, supra note 48, at 724 (footnote omitted).
52. Productivity techniques may include strategies for, inter alia, focusing one’s attention
deeply on the task at hand, minimizing distractions, and allocating one’s time effectively among
different tasks. See, e.g., Bloom II, supra note 33, at 330; Schwartz I, supra note 1, at 458–59.
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4. Identifies personal weaknesses or barriers that
may hinder progress toward the goals;
5. Identifies an array of possible strategies that she
could use to achieve the goals;
6. Selects the specific strategies that she believes will
be most effective and efficient;
7. Performs the task, using the selected strategies;
8. Collects information that may indicate whether
the performance was successful or not, including
information generated by external sources (e.g., a
test grade or a judge’s ruling) as well as information generated by the actor herself;
9. Identifies the specific characteristics of a performance that achieves the goals identified in step 1,
as well as the specific characteristics of a performance that fails in those goals;
10. Evaluates specific ways in which her own performance either met or failed to meet the goals;
11. Identifies what contributed to both the successful
and unsuccessful aspects of her performance; and
12. Identifies how she should adjust or adapt her
thinking and behavior in order to improve her
performance in the future.
Once the metacognitive thinker reaches step 12, she starts the
cycle anew at step 1, redefining her learning goals based on
what she has just experienced. As she proceeds once again
through the entire cycle, she applies what she learned from her
prior experience to further modify her thinking and actions. The
more often that the cycle is repeated, the more opportunities she
has to refine her approach and to achieve greater success. The
actual performance of the task at hand serves as the central catalyst for learning, and careful attention to her own thought
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processes and behaviors empowers her to self-improve. In sum,
a strong metacognitive thinker carefully plans out, evaluates,
and modifies her thinking processes and behaviors, with the explicit purpose of improving her outcomes.
The metacognitive approach may seem to some like a common sense or “natural” learning process, but it is in fact highly
counterintuitive and unnatural for most, since it asks people to
question their instinctual thinking patterns and behaviors, and
to affirmatively replace their default patterns with different
ones. Thus, “‘[m]etacognition is not an automatic process,’ but
is rather, the result of an active and constant manipulation of
one’s cognitive process.”53 Consequently, the metacognitive approach is not innate or easily adopted, but must be explicitly
taught,54 consciously engaged in, and repeatedly practiced in
order to be successful.55
Accordingly, law students need careful, step-by-step training
to build and develop their metacognitive skills over time.56 The
twelve steps will eventually become more automatic and seamless (for example, a very experienced trial lawyer can absorb
feedback from a witness, judge, and jury simultaneously, and
accordingly can alter her cross-examination strategies mid-

53. Niedwiecki II, supra note 11, at 42 (quoting Rebecca Jacobson, Teachers Improving Learning
Using Metacognition with Self-monitoring Learning, 111 EDUC. 579, 581 (1998)).
54. See, e.g., Bloom II, supra note 33, at 329 (“I work to provide my students with ‘pedagogical context’ by being “explicit and transparent about teaching metacognition.” (internal citations omitted)); Fruehwald, supra note 8, at 109.
55. “[S]uccessfully training students to be metacognitive thinkers requires time and repetition.” Adam Lamparello, The Integrated Law School Curriculum, 8 ELON L. REV. 407, 434 (2016)
(discussing a writing program that runs over the course of six semesters).
56. See, e.g., Preston et al., supra note 1, at 1062–73 (discussing a study demonstrating that
entering law students have poor metacognitive skills); Casey, supra note 15, at 350–51 (“[T]hinking in action is particularly difficult for [student] practitioners because they do not have experience to guide them in deciding what to consider,” such that teaching the reflective process
through post-hoc examination, which “decoupl[es] . . . thought and action,” is critical “to develop
the capacity of the new lawyer to think in action” and to “instill a default preference for reflection.”). “Millennials” may be particularly in need of formal training in order to engage in selfreflection. See e.g., Alistair E. Newbern & Emily F. Suski, Translating the Values of Clinical Pedagogy Across Generations, 20 CLINICAL L. REV. 181 (2013); Emily A. Benfer & Colleen F. Shanahan,
Educating the Invincibles: Strategies for Teaching the Millennial Generation in Law School, 20
CLINICAL L. REV. 1 (2013).
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stream or “in real time”57). However, such metacognitive mastery usually only comes after many years of professional practice. For law students lacking those years of experience, metacognitive skills must be taught explicitly and practiced
repeatedly. The following section discusses commonalities in
how these skills are taught by metacognitive experts in various
areas of the curriculum.
B. The Recursive Cycle
The most well-developed models for teaching metacognition
in law school break it down into a clearly articulated, threephase cycle that occurs recursively over a period of study. Two
very similar models are discussed below, one that is designed
for first-year students and refers to the three-phase cycle of
“forethought, performance, and reflection.”58 The other model
has been widely taught for decades in experiential courses and
refers to a similar cycle of “plan, do, and reflect.”59

57. See Casey, supra note 15, at 350–51 (“The truly reflective practitioner engages in contemporaneous thinking in action…[she] has the capacity to analyze the context and adapt the performance while the decision is still under consideration.”).
58. Schwartz I, supra note 1, at 454 (emphasis omitted).
59. See generally Kimberly O’Leary, Evaluating Clinical Law Teaching-Suggestions for Law Professors Who Have Never Used the Clinical Teaching Method, 29 N. KY. L. REV. 491, 510 (2002) (“Many
clinical professors find the heart of the course is in teaching students how to engage in the threepart process for their professional lives (developing action plans, executing those plans, reflecting on those plans).”); William P. Quigley, Introduction to Clinical Teaching for the New Clinical
Law Professor: A View from the First Floor, 28 AKRON L. REV. 463, 477 (1995); Meredith Heagney,
Plan, Do, Reflect: Clinical Teaching at the Law School, U. OF CHIC. L. SCH. (Apr., 22, 2013),
https://www.law.uchicago.edu/news/plan-do-reflect-clinical-teaching-law-school. Externship
pedagogy has similarly long emphasized a cycle of “Plan, Do, Reflect, Integrate,” as memorialized in a leading textbook for externship courses, Learning from Practice, the second edition of
which states as “its central theme [] teaching students how to learn from experience, how to
become reflective practitioners.” As the authors say, the text is infused with the “mantra-like
method for reflective lawyering: Plan, Do, Reflect, Integrate.” Erica M. Eisinger, The Externship
Class Requirement: An Idea Whose Time Has Passed, 10 CLINICAL L. REV. 659, 672 (2004); see also J.P.
OGILVY, LEAH WORTHAM, & LISA G. LERMAN, LEARNING FROM PRACTICE, 3 (“to maximize learning from experience, need to plan for the experience, have the experience, reflect on what happened, and integrate or synthesize what is been learned with existing knowledge and other
sources of learning.”) [hereinafter LEARNING FROM PRACTICE]. For a four-stage variation on this
cycle, see, e.g., Nancy M. Maurer & Liz Ryan Cole, Design, Teach, and Manage: Ensuring Educational Integrity in Field Placement Courses, 19 CLINICAL L. REV. 115, 145–46 (2012).
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Professor Michael Hunter Schwartz developed a groundbreaking two-week course for first-year students60 that teaches
a variety of skills that law students must master, such as identifying case holdings, understanding how lawyers “stretch” and
“squeeze” precedent, and breaking down rules into subparts.61
The course also explicitly teaches the benefits of the metacognitive approach, its step-by-step process, and how to engage in
each step, with the goal of training students to become “selfregulated learners.”62 As students grapple with specific legal
analysis skills, they are simultaneously guided through exercises that expose them to metacognitive techniques and
strengthen their skills.63 Tools of instruction include faculty
modeling of the skills to be learned, practice questions and exams with feedback, as well as reflection, journaling, cooperative
learning groups, attention to adaptive (regulating) behaviors,
and attention to affective concerns that can hinder learning such
as motivational factors and stress management.64
These exercises help students to plot out their learning strategies, aid them in evaluating whether they are properly learning the material, and encourage them to design and implement
strategies for improvement.65 The course takes place just before
the traditional first-year curriculum begins, so students can apply these methods throughout their first-year doctrinal courses
and beyond. Professor Schwartz also directed a task force focused on re-designing the traditional first-year curriculum to
actively further the self-regulated learning process, with the
goal of creating an integrated curriculum.66

60. Schwartz I, supra note 1, at 484. The course was first piloted in Fall of 2002 at Western
State. Id. at 451.
61. MICHAEL HUNTER SCHWARTZ, EXPERT LEARNING FOR LAW STUDENTS passim (2d ed. 2015)
[hereinafter SCHWARTZ III].
62. See id. at 4–5.
63. See Schwartz I, supra note 1, at 495–97.
64. See id. at 495–97 (discussing techniques and rationale for teaching the metacognitive approach); SCHWARTZ III, supra note 61.
65. Schwartz I, supra note 1, at 499–501.
66. Id.
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Professor Schwartz’s model presents the metacognitive approach as a 3-phased cycle of “forethought, performance, and
reflection,” which mimics the “basic, recurring, overarching instructional approach typical of successful self-regulated learning programs.”67 In the “forethought” phase, a student explores
and prepares for the activity (steps 1-6 in the metacognitive approach as described above).68 The student then performs the activity (step 7, above), such as briefing a case in preparation for
class, taking a practice test, or drafting a written assignment.69
Finally, the student reflects on and evaluates her performance
(steps 8 through 11, above), both looking backward to examine
what she did and whether she was successful or not, and looking forward to identify how she will fix flaws in her thinking
and actions next time.70 Then, the forethought-performance-reflection cycle begins again as she prepares for the next round of
activity, applying the lessons culled from the prior experience
to try to improve her outcomes.
Another curricular area that frequently refers to a three-phase
process is experiential learning.71 The “forethought, performance, and reflection” phases are more commonly referred to
by experiential experts as “plan, do, reflect,” but the phases are
conceptually identical: first, students prepare for the task at
hand, then they engage in the task, and finally they seek to understand their actions and the results, and to identify and implement ways to improve.72
The three-phase cycle works in an experiential course similarly to how it works in a nonclinical course. The main difference is that in a nonexperiential course, the cycle generally centers around the performance of a classroom task such as
briefing a case or taking a midterm exam,73 while in clinical
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id. at 491, 454–55.
See id. at 455–58.
See id. at 458–60.
See id. at 460–61.
See supra note 59.
See supra note 59.
See, e.g., SCHWARTZ III, supra note 61, at 32.
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settings the cycle centers around the performance of a lawyering activity, such as a client interview.74 The initial planning
phase for a client interview usually involves readings and seminar discussion exploring theoretical frameworks for interviewing along with concrete interviewing techniques.75 These help
students articulate their goals for the task: what do they hope to
accomplish during the client interview? Why? How? Such questions aid in the first of the twelve steps, which is goal setting.76
The planning stage continues as students assess available resources, such as the client file and doctrinal knowledge learned
in prior courses; determine if additional resources or research is
necessary; and then use these resources to prepare a written interview strategy, including drafting specific questions they will
ask the client. These activities correspond to the planning and
task-performance steps of the process.77
Students then receive feedback on their research and interview plans and revise as necessary. This phase corresponds to
the reflection stage,78 with the cycle starting over again as the
students re-consider their interview strategy, conduct additional legal and factual research, and revise their questions.
They might also perform a mock interview, gain more feedback,
and reflect on the experience, then once again revise their plans,
completing yet another “plan, do, reflect” mini-cycle.
Once students are adequately prepared, they interview the
actual client and afterward are guided through another postperformance reflection, during which they use their own selfassessment, any feedback from the client, and input from peers
and faculty to evaluate how their performance succeeded or
failed and why. The results of these reflections then help prepare them for their next performance, which may be a followup interview with the same client or a meeting with a new client, renewing the cycle once more and enabling students to
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

See, e.g., O’Leary, supra note 59, at 496.
See, e.g., id. at 496–97.
See Grose, supra note 28, at 497.
See supra Section I.A (discussing steps 2–7 of the metacognitive process).
See supra Section I.A (discussing steps 8–12 of the metacognitive process).
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transfer lessons learned to a different context. Clinical educators employ the plan-do-reflect cycle in this way—repeatedly
and extensively—for all types of lawyering activities, including
legal research, legal writing of all forms, trials and hearing, negotiations, and so forth.79
C. Reflective Questioning
How are students taught to engage in the metacognitive approach? Whatever the underlying content being taught , the
most prevalent technique for engaging students in metacognition is to ask carefully crafted reflective questions.80 Faculty use
reflective questioning to deliberately guide students to key issues that need attention—whether they are doctrinal issues, analytical thinking processes, or any other content that must be
learned—while encouraging students to identify their own
strengths and weaknesses and strategies for improvement,
which is one of the hallmarks of metacognitive approach, as discussed further in Part II.
The simplest example of reflective questioning might merely
focus student attention on the key steps of goal setting and selfimprovement. Questions might include: “what do you hope to
learn from the upcoming experience? What did you in fact learn
from this experience? Why is this lesson relevant, and how will

79. E.g., O’Leary, supra note 59; see infra Section I.C (providing examples of clinical teachers
using reflective questioning to guide students through the three stages in the context of a trial
and other lawyering activities).
80. For illustrative purposes, this section provides specific examples of metacognitive reflective questions already in use in the context of legal education. It does not, however, touch upon
the extensive literature on reflection, which crosses many disciplines and addresses a voluminous range of issues. For a minute sampling of this literature, see DONALD SCHÖN, EDUCATING
THE REFLECTIVE PRACTITIONER: TOWARD A NEW DESIGN FOR TEACHING AND LEARNING IN THE
PROFESSIONS (1987); Elaine Surbeck et al., Assessing Reflective Responses in Journals, 47 EDUC.
LEADERSHIP 25 (1991); Christopher Branson, Improving Leadership by Nurturing Moral Consciousness through Students’ Self-Reflection, 45 J. EDUC. ADMIN. 471 (2007); Paul. J. Silva & Ann G. Phillips, Evaluating Self-Reflection and Insight as Self-Conscious Traits, 50 PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. REV. 370 (2002); STEPHEN KEMMIS, ACTION RESEARCH AND THE POLITICS OF
REFLECTION, IN REFLECTION: TURNING EXPERIENCE INTO LEARNING 139, 141 (David Boud et al.
eds., 1985).
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your new knowledge affect your future actions?” 81 Such questions may be sufficient for very simple learning activities, or for
those whose metacognitive skills are already well-developed.
More comprehensive reflective questions are better suited for
those engaging in complex material and/or who require training in the metacognitive process. Such questions walk students
through each individual step of the metacognitive approach.
For example, to help a student plan for producing a research
memorandum or taking a midterm, faculty may ask her to:
“determine what skills are called for and in what
form,”
“consider what resources are available, and”
“think about what generalized information from
[the present course] or other courses might aid her
inquiry.”82
Once a student has performed—for example, after she submits the draft memorandum or sits for the midterm—post-performance questions then guide her through the reflection stage.
A student might be asked:
to predict her grade or other external feedback
that she will receive;
to compare her prediction with the actual grade
or feedback received;
to assess why her prediction was accurate or inaccurate;
to articulate which specific aspects of the activity
she performed well, and which she did not perform well;

81. See, e.g., Lentz supra note 8, at 30–32 (explaining how reflective questions help students
achieve learning goals and giving examples of helpful questions).
82. Kowalski, supra note 35, at 58.
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to identify what contributed to those specific successes and failures; and
to develop ways to address their shortcoming as
she prepares for the next memorandum or exam.83
Such questions walk students through the processes of selfevaluation and self-improvement by focusing them on feedback
from outside sources, but also heavily emphasize the generation of feedback by the students themselves.84 They also encourage students to actively use this feedback to strategically and
intentionally design strategies for self-improvement.85
Examples from the experiential learning context further
demonstrate how reflective questioning guides students in actively generating much of their own metacognitive content.
Ann Shalleck’s seminal article on clinical supervision demonstrates this in the context of a faculty-student discussion during
the early stages of trial preparation.86 Questions might include:
“What are the legal consequences of [certain facts
presented by the client’s case]? . . . Think back to
what you know about remedies from other cases
. . .”
“What do you think the judge might think about
the [] issues you’re raising?”
“Given the conflict you’ve identified [between
your client’s interests and the judge’s interests],
how can you appeal to values that help your client?”
“[D]o you have a sense of which [witnesses] are
the most important for your case theory?”

83. See SCHWARTZ III, supra note 61, at 242.
84. See, e.g., Kowalski, supra note 35, at 57–58.
85. See, e.g., id.
86. Ann Shalleck, Clinical Contexts: Theory and Practice in Law and Supervision, 21 N.Y.U. REV.
L. & SOC. CHANGE 109, 117–23 (1994).
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“You have hard choices to make—how to pick
witnesses and structure each direct examination
. . . . Remember our class discussion about investigation and its relation to case theory. Think
about how each piece fits with the story you’re
telling. When we meet next time, let’s talk about
other ideas you may have and what you’ve decided to do.”87
These questions are carefully crafted to direct the students to
grapple with the preparatory stages of the metacognitive process, including identifying goals for the upcoming task (e.g., anticipating potential doctrinal and judicial concerns), and identifying resources and strategies to meet those goals (e.g.,
doctrinal knowledge from prior courses and trial strategies previously covered in the clinical seminar, including techniques for
the effective use of case theory, witnesses, and direct examination).
Clinical faculty also use reflective questioning to guide postperformance evaluation and self-improvement. Professor Beryl
Blaustone developed a thoughtful six-stage feedback model
that asks a student who has just completed a moot, simulation,
or live-client performance to reflect first on their performance
strengths, and then on their weaknesses, in each case followed
by peer reflections and faculty feedback.88 The model provides
a rigorous, structured format for generating both internallyand externally-generated reflections to help the student evaluate her performance and consider improvements for next time.89
Clinical faculty use many different types of reflective questioning to guide students through the planning, performance, and
reflection stages of all manners of lawyering activities, including interactions with clients and opposing counsel, legal research and writing, community education and legislative work,
87. Id. at 117–21.
88. Beryl Blaustone, Teaching Law Students to Self-Critique and to Develop Critical Clinical SelfAwareness in Performance, 13 CLINICAL L. REV. 143, 144 (2006).
89. Id.
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and various dispute resolution processes, such as mediations
and negotiations.90
As these examples show,91 both clinical and non-clinical educators use carefully crafted questions that intentionally require
students to closely examine and articulate their own mental
processes, thus engaging students deeply in generating their
own learning. This is a hallmark of metacognitive approach and
a key reason that it is so effective.92
In designing reflective questions, faculty must carefully consider what specific issues to direct students towards, factors
such as the existing metacognitive skill level of the students and
the complexity of the material being learned, and the appropriate format (e.g., in writing, via group or individual discussion,
via polling, etc.).93 Faculty must also consider the appropriate
level of faculty review and oversight of metacognitive reflections, which may range from none (e.g., written answers that
are never reviewed by faculty) to highly intensive (e.g., faculty
provide multiple rounds of reflective questions on multiple
drafts of court papers).
In sum, reflective questioning is a core metacognitive technique that can be implemented in ways ranging from relatively

90. See infra Section I.E.
91. Many other examples abound in the literature. For an example from the externship context, see LEARNING FROM PRACTICE, supra note 59, at 5–6 (proposing reflective questions for an
extern who is drafting an order for a judge, such as “before you begin drafting the order, you
will want to think through some personal goals for the project. . . . What specific skills you want
to improve? What type of critique and feedback you want? You might discuss the task and
review your learning goals with your faculty supervisor and seek the supervisor’s input.” After
the “doing” stage of writing the order, the text suggests how one might “reflect, analyze, and
integrate”: after getting feedback from the judge, “you could talk to the judge’s clerk to get
another perspective. You could write a journal entry about your experience. You could talk to
others or read articles about writing style or standards for reopening a default judgment. You
can think about how to incorporate the judge’s suggestions. . . . [S]ome reflection and analysis
should be you to integrate your learning from this experience with prior knowledge to create
new, or to modify existing common knowledge.”)
92. See infra Section III.B.
93. See, e.g., Niedwiecki II, supra note 11, at 64–68 (suggesting that faculty with limited time
to spend on metacognitive strategies can use technology such as learning blogs, message
boards, comment functions, and online assessments).
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simple94 to highly intensive, depending on the circumstances. It
can also be supplemented with other techniques, such as requiring students to draft their own metacognitive questions, take
quizzes focused on metacognition, and articulate their revised
understanding of the material after engaging in reflection.95 Further examples of detailed, well-designed metacognitive exercises that are adaptable to many contexts can be found in Professor Schwartz’s textbook for incoming first-year students96
and elsewhere throughout the literature.
D. Metacognition and Curricular Reform
As noted, the metacognitive approach is already employed
within many curricular specialties, including courses focused
on experiential learning, first-year students, legal research and
writing, ethics, professional identity and development, and academic support. However, the revolution is not being carried
out only by individual educators in specialized corners of the
curriculum. Curricular reform experts, tasked with improving
legal education nationwide, have embraced key elements of the
metacognitive process over the past several decades and have
increasingly brought them into “mainstream” discourse.
Among the most influential of these reform efforts are the
sweeping accreditation changes adopted in 2014 by the ABA
mandating that certain aspects of metacognitive training be incorporated into every law curriculum, as discussed below.
Chief among these is the obligation to provide all law students
with repeated opportunities for personal performance and

94. See, e.g., Alleva & Gundlach, supra note 48, at 727 (Metacognition “may not be as onerous
to integrate as one might think. The metacognitive task need not be overly complicated, and
simple illustrations might suffice for introducing the skill to first-year students. Also, the class
time a professor devotes to these exercises might be minimized by flipping some or all of this
instruction out of class.”).
95. See Elizabeth M. Bloom, Creating Desirable Difficulties: Strategies for Reshaping Teaching and
Learning in the Law School Classroom, 95 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 115, 135–50 (2018) [hereinafter
Bloom III].
96. SCHWARTZ III, supra note 61.
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reflection—activities that lie at the heart of the metacognitive
process.
Before discussing the accreditation mandates themselves, it is
worthwhile to note that these mandates were preceded by three
influential studies concerning the future of legal education that
emphasized certain metacognitive principles. The first, popularly referred to as the MacCrate Report, was issued in 1992 after three years of work by an ABA task force.97 Among other
things, the MacCrate Report emphasized that lawyers must develop skills in self-reflection and self-awareness, enabling them
to engage in “lifelong learning” and continued intellectual
growth even after formal education ends.98 These are hallmarks
of the metacognitive process.99
Two additional reports were issued a decade and a half later,
in 2007, and later deemed by a special ABA committee as
demonstrative of “the best thinking” of legal educators.100 These
reports are known colloquially as the “Carnegie Report,”101
which discussed the results of a two-year study commissioned
by the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching,
and as “Best Practices,” produced by the Clinical Legal Education Association.102 Among other things, both reports highlighted the importance of the cycle of planning, doing, and reflecting,103 with the Carnegie Report stating that students “must
become ‘metacognitive’ about their own learning.”104
97. AM. BAR ASS’N, SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. AND ADMISSION TO THE BAR, LEGAL EDUCATION
PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT—AN EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM, REPORT OF THE TASK
FORCE ON LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PROFESSION: NARROWING THE GAP (1992) [hereinafter
MACCRATE REPORT].
98. Id., at 336.
99. See infra Part III.
100. LORI E. SHAW & VICTORIA L. VANZANDT, STUDENT LEARNING OUTCOMES AND LAW
SCHOOL ASSESSMENT: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO MEASURING INSTITUTIONAL EFFECTIVENESS 25
(2015) (citing the conclusion of the Outcomes Measures Committee, appointed in 2008 by the
ABA’s Section on Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar).
101. WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE PROFESSION
OF LAW 15–17 (2007) [hereinafter CARNEGIE REPORT].
102. ROY STUCKEY, ET AL., BEST PRACTICES FOR LEGAL EDUCATION: A VISION AND ROADMAP
vii (2007) [hereinafter BEST PRACTICES].
103. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 101, at 107; BEST PRACTICES, supra note 102, at 126–27.
104. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 101, at 173.
AND
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These reports were among those studied closely by the ABA
as it undertook a comprehensive 8-year review of accreditation
standards, resulting in monumental reforms adopted in 2014.105
The revisions endorse elements of the metacognitive approach
by requiring all accredited institutions to give students multiple
opportunities for performance and reflection, as discussed below.106 Under these new standards, every legal educator and administrator must now grapple with the teachings of the metacognitive revolution to some extent.
A brief review of the accreditation standards will demonstrate these points. The discussion begins with the standards for
experiential education, which reflect the earliest embrace of
metacognitive techniques, followed by a discussion of the 2014
standards, which mandate certain techniques to be used
throughout the law curriculum as a whole.
1. Experiential standards
Experiential learning standards were the first to emphasize
student self-reflection, with the purpose of encouraging self-assessment and self-evaluation. Since 2005, all schools were required to provide “substantial opportunities for . . . real-life
practice experiences . . . designed to encourage reflection by
students on their experiences . . . and the development of one’s
ability to assess his or her performance and level of competence.”107 Today’s standards require that every student complete six or more credit hours of experiential learning,108 which
must offer multiple “opportunities for student performance,
self-evaluation, and feedback.”109 Externships must additionally
incorporate “ongoing, contemporaneous, faculty-guided
105. SHAW & VANZANDT, supra note 100, at 25–26.
106. 2018–2019 ABA STANDARDS, supra note 12; see infra Section I.D.1.
107. AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA STANDARDS AND RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW
SCHOOLS 2005–2006 § 302(b)(1) (2005). Even earlier, the 2004–2005 standards required all field
placements to “provide opportunities for student reflection on their . . . experience, through a
seminar, regularly scheduled tutorials, or other means of guided reflection.” Id. at § 305(e)(7).
108. 2018–2019 ABA STANDARDS, supra note 12, at § 303(a)(3).
109. Id. at § 304(a)(3)–(4).
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reflection.”110 These standards clearly emphasize fundamental
metacognitive principles.
2. Throughout the broader curriculum
In 2014, the ABA adopted a requirement that the non-experiential curriculum also provide multiple opportunities for student performance, accompanied by feedback.111 All law schools
must now not only employ summative assessments, which
measure competency at the end of the course of study (e.g., a
final exam), but also formative assessments, which measure student competency while a course of study is ongoing (e.g., a midterm exam or other mid-course assignment).112 The critical difference between the two is that while summative assessment
merely measures student learning at the close of the course,
formative assessment gives students an opportunity to learn
from the experience and to try do better on the next one; this is
why formative assessment specifically must “provide[] meaningful feedback to improve student learning.”113 While the ABA
110. Id. at § 304(a)(5); see also Rebecca B. Rosenfeld, The Examined Externship Is Worth Doing:
Critical Self-Reflection & Externship Pedagogy, 21 CLINICAL L. REV. 127 (2014) (arguing that classes
and educators should aid students in their reflections to foster present and future learning).
111. 2018–2019 ABA STANDARDS, supra note 12, at § 314. Standard 314 does not require formative assessment to be used in every course but does require that formative assessment be used
within the law school curriculum as a whole. See SHAW & VANZANDT, supra note 100, at 28. For
the phased-in implementation timeline for this requirement, see AM. BAR ASS’N, Transition to
and Implementation of the New Standards and Rules of Approval of Law Schools (Aug. 13, 2014),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_and_admissions_to_the_bar/governancedocuments/2014_august_transition_and_implementation_of_new_aba_standards_and_rules.pdf.
112. 2018–2019 ABA STANDARDS, supra note 12, at § 314 (Interpretation 314-1 states: “Formative assessment methods are measurements at different points during a particular course or at
different points over the span of a student’s education that provide meaningful feedback to
improve student learning. Summative assessment methods are measurements at the culmination of a particular course or at the culmination of any part of a student’s legal education that
measure the degree of student learning.”).
113. Id.; see also SHAW & VANZANDT, supra note 100, at 6–7 (“The best formative assessments
involve individual feedback not only as to the product produced, but the process employed . . .
instead of simply providing a numeric or letter grade [], it is important that [the] professor specifically identify what was wrong with [the work] product…ideally, [the] professor will also
help the student explore the reasons for this failure. . . . Formative assessment helps a student
see where in the learning process he made a wrong (or a correct) turn and make any needed
changes on his next assignment.”).
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did not define “meaningful feedback,” experts explain that it
requires enough guidance to enable a student to reflect upon
and improve her performance.114
The formative-assessment-with-meaningful-feedback requirement thus echoes the 3-phased metacognitive cycle. Scholarship linking metacognition and formative assessment has
blossomed since the ABA standards were proposed, with one
scholar noting that when administering formative assessments,
“it is critical to reinforce metacognition and self-regulated
learning principles by stating that receiving the score or written
feedback is not the end of the learning process. In fact, receiving
the grade is somewhere in the middle of the process. The next
step is to evaluate one’s process, attribute the results, and plan
for future assignments.”115Along these lines, the ABA further
recommends that all law schools consider training students in
“self-evaluation.”116 At least 24 schools have already adopted either “reflection” or “evaluation” as an official learning outcome.117 This recommendation is yet another way that the ABA
today promotes metacognitive concepts as fundamental to the
process of learning law.

114. See 2018–2019 ABA STANDARDS, supra note 12, at § 314; Elizabeth Ruiz Frost, Feedback
Distortion: The Shortcomings of Model Answers as Formative Feedback, 65 J. LEGAL EDUC. 938, 942
(2016) (“Feedback is not truly formative unless it helps a student develop her learning strategies
or knowledge to a higher degree than before the particular assessment event.”).
115. Cara Cunningham Warren, Achieving the American Bar Association’s Pedagogy Mandate:
Empowerment in the Midst of a “Perfect Storm,” 14 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 67, 99 (2014); see also, e.g.,
Larry O. Natt Gantt, II, The Pedagogy of Problem Solving: Applying Cognitive Science to Teaching
Legal Problem Solving, 45 CREIGHTON L. REV. 699, 754 (2012); Steven I. Friedland, Rescuing Pluto
from the Cold: Creating an Assessment-Centered Legal Education, 67 J. LEGAL EDUC. 592, 605 (2018).
116. The suggestion arises in the context of the ABA’s requirement that every law school
articulate its curricular goals in the form of “learning outcomes,” or the professional competencies deemed to be so fundamental that every student must receive instruction in those competencies. See 2018-2019 ABA STANDARDS, supra note 12, at § 301.
Some learning outcomes are mandatory, while others are not mandatory but are suggested. See
id. at § 302.
117. Jodi S. Balsam et al., Assessing Law Students As Reflective Practitioners, 62 N.Y.L. SCH. L.
REV. 49, 52 (2018). For example, Alexander Blewett III School of Law identifies “the capacity for
self-reflection as key to continuous learning, self-improvement, and self-development.” Our
Mission, Goals, and Graduates, UNIV. OF MONT., https://www.umt.edu/law/files/admissions/student-learning-outcomes.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2019).
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3. Institutional mandate
Finally, it is noteworthy that the metacognitive revolution is
transforming not only the classroom, but the institutional accreditation process itself. The ABA now requires every law
school to metacognitively assess and improve its own curriculum.118 The standards state that every institution must “conduct
ongoing evaluation of [its] program of legal education, learning
outcomes, and assessment methods; and shall use the results of
this evaluation to determine the degree of student attainment
of competency in the learning outcomes and to make appropriate changes to improve the curriculum.”119 This requires periodic evaluation by each institution of a representative cross-section of students120 for the purpose of assessing whether the
institution is succeeding in teaching its required competencies.121
This institutional assessment process also mimics the 3-phase
“plan, do, reflect” metacognitive cycle by requiring planning
and goal setting (schools must designate learning outcomes and
determine how to achieve them); focusing on institutional performance (whether a school’s students in fact achieve competency); and requiring institutional self-evaluation and the identification of improvements for the future.122 Thus, the ABA
demands that not only students, but faculty and their institutions as a whole, must now routinely engage in the metacognitive process.

118. 2018-2019 ABA STANDARDS, supra note 12, at § 315.
119. Id.
120. SHAW & VANZANDT, supra note 100, at 28 (“Periodic measures of the performance of
sample groups of students provide snapshots of whether your school is achieving its outcomes.
Institutional outcomes assessment uses your students’ collective performance as a measure of
your school’s performance.”).
121. Id. at 26 (“Outcomes Assessment is a way to require schools to identify exactly what
competencies they seek to provide and to take a hard look at whether they are actually graduating students who possess those competencies.”).
122. SHAW &VANZANDT, supra note 100, at 26, 28; Heagney, supra note 59.

LEE FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

256

2/12/2020 5:19 PM

DREXEL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 12:227

E. Experiential Theory and Practice
The discussion above draws examples from both the non-experiential and experiential realms to illustrate the components
of the metacognitive revolution. Given that prior literature on
metacognition in legal education very rarely refers to clinical
theory and practice,123 it is helpful to briefly explain why this
article takes a different approach.
As demonstrated above, metacognition and experiential
methodology share a number of foundational principles and
practices. Both treat the performance of a task as the central catalyst for learning.124 Experts in both realms widely embrace the
same teaching techniques,125 such as the 3-phase cycle and reflective questioning, and emphasize the same educational benefits, including lifelong learning skills,126 transfer skills, and student empowerment.127 A seminal article from 1984 on clinical
methodology refers to the “development of ‘models of analysis
for understanding past experience and for predicting and planning future conduct’” that uses reflective questioning focused
on goal identification, strategy selection, self-evaluation, and

123. The connection between metacognition and clinical theory and practice is sometimes
noted in passing. See, e.g., Alleva & Gundlach, supra note 48, at 738 (noting that clinical pedagogy is explicit about its teaching of the metacognitive process); Schwartz II, supra note 23, at
380–81 (noting that clinics use and write about metacognition); Anzalone, supra note 13, at 92
(stating that clinics write the most about reflection); Kowalski, supra note 35, at 85 (noting that
clinics sometimes use the transfer skills she espouses). Other passing references appear to assert
that there is no connection. See, e.g., Preston et al., supra note 1, at 1082, 1090 (stating that experiential learning pedagogy “needs to be constructed with acute awareness of the need to inculcate metacognitive skills” and describing the first advocacy of metacognition in the law curriculum as occurring in 1988); Shaw, supra note 24, at 1284 (identifying “another factor—one that
proponents of contextual or experiential learning have missed”—as “the crucial need for students to master metacognition as an integral part of being a good lawyer”).
124. See, e.g., Jerome Frank, Why Not a Clinical Lawyer-School?, 81 U. PA. L. REV. 907 (1933);
Anthony G. Amsterdam, A Clinical Legal Education—A 21st Century Perspective, 34 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 612, 616–17 (1984) ; DAVID A. KOLB, EXPERIENTIAL LEARNING: EXPERIENCE AS A SOURCE OF
LEARNING AND DEVELOPMENT (Amy Neidlinger et al., eds., 2d ed. 2014).
125. While not all clinicians universally adhere to the same methods and principles, after an
extensive literature review, Professor Carolyn Grose articulated a number of principles at the
core of a “diffuse consensus” on the clinical approach. Grose, supra note 28, at 491–92.
126. “Clinical pedagogy aims to teach students how to learn.” Id. at 494–95.
127. See infra Section III.B.
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self-improvement—a statement that equally describes the metacognitive approach.128
The focus on self-reflection as a catalyst for self-improvement
is especially well-documented in the clinical literature. Decades
ago, experts were already exploring the practical and theoretical bases for using reflection as a primary tool for learning and
improvement. In 1979, for example, David Barnhizer wrote
about the clinical use of reflection to prompt students to explore
their professional responsibilities,129 and in 1981, Kenneth Kreiling cited Donald Schön’s influential theory130 of “professional
practice” or “theories in action” to explain how clinicians develop students’ self-reflection skills.131 Today, this emphasis on
“[d]eliberate and systematic reflection”132 remains one of the
three most dominant clinical teaching methodologies, such that
“[t]he bottom line is that clinical pedagogy aims to teach students to approach lawyering as a theory-driven practice, framing each activity with intentionality and reflection.”133

128. Amsterdam, supra note 124, at 617.
129. David R. Barnhizer, The Clinical Method of Legal Instruction: Its Theory and Implementation,
30 J. LEGAL EDUC. 67, 147 (1979) (pointing out that clinical methodology “consistently creates
the opportunity, structure, and motivation for law students reflectively and critically to analyze
their own personal systems and attitudes of professional responsibility in an internalized, nonabstract setting, prior to their being subjected to the intense and distorting pressures of the postgraduate legal profession.”).
130. See CHRIS ARGYRIS & DONALD SCHÖN, THEORY IN PRACTICE: INCREASING PROFESSIONAL
EFFECTIVENESS 1–20 (1974).
131. Kenneth R. Kreiling, Clinical Education and Lawyer Competency: The Process of Learning to
Learn from Experience Through Properly Structured Clinical Supervision, 40 MD. L. REV. 284, 289–90
(1981).
132. Grose, supra note 28, at 500.
133. Id. at 493, 500 (“Reflection is the method that guides students’ extraction of theory from
practice, and the application of practice to theory; and it pushes students to generalize from the
specific and transfer their learning beyond that specific. The role of the clinical teacher is ‘to . . .
enhance self-reflection, self-consciousness and a more encompassing understanding of those
phenomena of the legal order which are the focus of pedagogic inquiry.’”); see also Barry et al.,
supra note 12, at 72; Casey, supra note 15, at 331–48; Laurie Morin & Louise Howells, The Reflective Judgment Project, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 623, 637–40 (2003); Phyllis Goldfarb, A Theory-Practice
Spiral: The Ethics of Feminism & Clinical Education, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1599, 1649–52 (1991) (“The
success of [placing students in lawyering roles] as pedagogy depends on the employment of a
method of careful and sensitive review throughout the planning and evaluation process. Such
a review should encompass a scrupulous self-assessment to help students understand what has
transpired and plan future conduct.”).
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Given the close alignments between the metacognitive and
clinical approaches, it is not surprising that a leading scholar
has already examined the symmetries between them in the context of non-legal education.134 Nor is it surprising that legal
scholars celebrated a foundational 1978 clinical textbook as “an
example of metacognition at its best,” 135 correlating the textbook’s major themes with the key components of metacognition
as defined by the inventor of that term.136 Furthermore, it is not
surprising that much of the metacognition scholarship on nonexperiential law teaching is in fact produced by those who also
teach experiential courses.137
What is surprising, however, is the lack of discussion about
how experiential and non-experiential scholarship on metacognitive principles can inform and strengthen each other. A possible explanation for this absence is that clinicians themselves
do not often use the term “metacognition,” perhaps because
that term had not yet entered academic discourse by the time
that foundational works of clinical scholarship were being written.138 Another possible reason is that faculty who teach clinical
134. See Alice Y. Kolb & David A. Kolb, The Learning Way: Meta-cognitive Aspects of Experiential Learning, 40 SIMULATION & GAMING 297 (2009).
135. John M. A. DiPippa & Martha M. Peters, The Lawyering Process: An Example of Metacognition at Its Best, 10 CLINICAL L. REV. 311, 312 (2003) (discussing GARY BELLOW & BEA MOULTON,
THE LAWYERING PROCESS: MATERIALS FOR CLINICAL INSTRUCTION IN ADVOCACY (1978) as part
of a symposium celebrating its 25th anniversary and its influence on the field of clinical law
teaching); see also Leah Wortham, The Lawyering Process: My Thanks for the Book and the Movie, 10
CLINICAL L. REV. 399, 406 (2003).
136. DiPippa & Peters, supra note 135.
137. See Elizabeth Adamo Usman, Making Legal Education Stick: Using Cognitive Science to
Foster Long-Term Learning in the Legal Writing Classroom, 29 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 355, 386–87
(2016).
138. See e.g., DiPippa & Peters, supra note 135, at 315 (“Without using the term metacognition, Bellow and Moulton embraced a metacognitive approach that only later was formally introduced to learning theory.”); accord id. at 315 n.20 (“Metacognition as a defined process developed around the mid to late 70s the same time that THE LAWYERING PROCESS was being written.
John H. Flavell was the first to define and use this term.”). Another possible reason is that clinical and non-clinical teaching are seen as too distinct to engage in productive dialogue; admittedly, engaging in the actual practice of law creates learning opportunities of unique intensity
and complexity that cannot be replicated in nonclinical settings, see, e.g., Amsterdam, supra note
124, at 616–17, and differences naturally exist in how metacognitive theory is applied in nonclinical and clinical settings. However, these differences do not mean that important concepts
and ideas cannot be translated from one setting to another.
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courses too often receive no institutional support for the production of scholarship, which limits academic dialogue.139
Whatever the reasons, the gap between clinical and metacognition scholarship hinders the productive cross-fertilization of
ideas.
Part III of this article offers a first contribution towards closing this gap. Prior to turning to that effort, however, Part II explains the benefits of the metacognitive approach and why it
deserves such extensive attention.
II. THE POWER OF THE REVOLUTION
Having demonstrated how broadly and deeply the metacognitive revolution is already embedded into the law curriculum,
the next question is: why does this revolution matter? The short
answer is that metacognition can dramatically improve all manners of legal competencies. It also develops the skills necessary
for continued intellectual growth after formal education ends
and enhances the elusive, yet critically important qualities of
“good judgment” and “intelligence.” These and other powerful
implications of the metacognitive approach are discussed below.
A. Metacognition Strengthens Competencies
1. Legal competencies
As demonstrated above, the metacognitive process is taught
contemporaneously with other material that is fundamental to
legal analysis. The underlying content may be doctrinal content
alone; doctrinal analysis combined with methods of communicating with others about the law, such as a client or tribunal; the
exploration of moral and ethical dimensions of the law; or any
139. See, e.g., ROBERT R. KUEHN & DAVID A. SANTACROCE WITH MARGARET RUETER & SUE
SCHECHTER, CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF APPLIED LEGAL EDUCATION, THE 2016-17 SURVEY OF
APPLIED LEGAL EDUCATION (2017); Peter A. Joy & Robert R. Kuehn, The Evolution of ABA Standards for Clinical Faculty, 75 Tenn. L. Rev. 183, 191 (2008); Barry et al., supra note 12, at 74–75; Cf.
Mary Beth Beazley, Finishing the Job of Legal Education Reform, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 275, 295
(2016) (encouraging enhanced status for legal writing faculty).
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other material. Whatever the underlying content, metacognitive
thinking results in deeper learning of that content.140 Metacognition has also been shown to improve students’ abilities to integrate out-of-classroom experiences and personal values with
classroom learning and to gather feedback and use it to improve
performance, as well as to increase student engagement and
motivation.141
Most empirical literature on the benefits of metacognition exists in non-law contexts142 and provides overwhelming evidence of its educational value; as previously noted, hundreds
of studies link certain aspects of metacognitive learning to better educational outcomes, and as that body research is well-covered elsewhere, it need not be explored here.143 As for the lawspecific context, the benefits of metacognition have been touted
by the ABA and the authors of the MacCrate Report, the Carnegie Report, and Best Practices among others.144 Faculty who
teach the metacognitive approach also report improvement in
student competencies as measured both through their own observations145 and through empirical studies. After teaching two
pilot sections of his course for first-year students on core legal
analysis skills and metacognitive skills,146 for example, Professor Schwartz found that 90% of students demonstrated

140. For an extensive review of the literature, see Schwartz I, supra note 1, at 466–67, 472–84;
Alleva & Gundlach, supra note 48, at 723 n.55 (citing “notable support for the theory that integrating the teaching of metacognitive skills with the teaching of substantive content can improve students’ deep learning of the subject matter”).
141. For just one discussion of the many benefits of metacognitive training, see Lentz, supra
note 8, at 38–39.
142. Schwartz I, supra note 1, at 473–75 (citing only 4 studies in the context of legal education).
143. See id. at 472; infra Section II.D; see also Preston et al., supra note 1, at 1062.
144. See infra Section II.D; see also Schwartz I, supra note 1, at 467–68.
145. One anecdotal example provided by a legal writing professor, reports that metacognitive exercises helped her students generate their own highly productive advice to themselves,
such as to “(1) read cases more carefully; (2) outline before they write; (3) allow more time for
correcting citation before the assignment is due; and (4) spend more time thinking before writing.” Joi Montiel, Empower the Student, Liberate the Professor: Self-Assessment by Comparative Analysis, 39 S. ILL. U. L.J. 249, 251–52 (2015).
146. Schwartz I, supra note 1, at 484.
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competency on the final exam with respect to case reading and
case briefing.147
Empirical studies conducted by Professor Andrea Curcio in
her civil procedure and evidence courses also demonstrate the
value of metacognitive techniques. In the first study, students
who took practice essay questions with feedback performed
better on average on the final exam than students who took no
formative assessments.148 A second study gave some students
not just formative assessments but also metacognitive reflective
exercises; an impressive 70% of these students scored nearly a
full letter grade higher than those who participated in neither
formative assessments nor reflective exercises.149 Importantly,
the addition of reflective exercises also enabled some students
with low first-year GPAs to “catch up” with and perform as
well as their better-credentialed peers, while formative assessments alone only benefited those with already-strong LSAT
scores and GPAs.150 Thus, these studies suggest both the benefits of formative assessments, and that additional metacognitive
reflection exercises can provide even greater benefits to a
greater number and wider range of students, including some
with low first-year grades.
2. Intelligence
Metacognition has been shown to not only enhance learning
within specific law courses, but to maximize intelligence itself.
By improving higher-order thinking such as analysis and synthesis, and by enabling transfer of concepts between seemingly
disparate contexts,
[m]etacognition enhances intelligence and increases the ability to learn and to perform
147. Id. at 505.
148. Andrea A. Curcio, Gregory Todd Jones, & Tanya M. Washington, Developing an Empirical Model to Test Whether Required Writing Exercises or Other Changes in Large-Section Law Class
Teaching Methodologies Result in Improved Exam Performance, 57 J. LEGAL EDUC. 195, 196 (2007);
Sargent & Curcio, supra note 9, at 383–84.
149. Sargent & Curcio, supra note 9, at 395.
150. Id. at 401.
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thinking tasks––it is the skill that maximizes the
utility of intelligence. Thus, students with lesser
intellectual ability who have greater metacognitive skills often demonstrate academic performance similar to students with higher intellectual
ability. For instance, one study found that “intellectual ability uniquely accounted for 10% of variance in learning performance, metacognitive
skillfulness uniquely accounted for 17% of variance in learning performance, while both predictors shared another 22% of variance in learning.”
Thus, metacognitive abilities combined with intelligence are a greater predictor of learning performance than intelligence alone.151
Preston further cites studies finding that among students of
similar intelligence levels, those who received metacognitive
training outperformed peers who did not,152 and that students
initially performing at an average level (fiftieth percentile) can
rise to the top quarter by using metacognitive strategies.153
3. Lifelong learning
Metacognitive training also empowers students with an effective method of learning that will benefit them throughout their
lifetimes.154 A strong metacognitive thinker is a “lifelong”
learner, meaning that no matter what new intellectual challenges she faces throughout her career, she can master that challenge with relative efficiency.155 As one scholar puts it, metacognitive training “teach[es] students how to fish.”156 Another
151. Preston et al., supra note 1, at 1060–61.
152. Id. at 1061.
153. Id. at 1061–62. However, other studies suggest that a high or low GPA could not be
predicted solely by the students’ level of metacognition. Id. at 1071.
154. See, e.g., Schwartz I, supra note 1, at 468–71 (“Teaching students how to be lifelong learners is, in fact, the core goal of the self-regulated learning movement.”); Alleva & Gundlach, supra
note 48, at 724.
155. See, e.g., Lentz, supra note 8, at 21.
156. Grose, supra note 28, at 501.
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describes it as “the beginning of the students’ development of
conscious, rigorous self-evaluative methodologies for learning
from experience — the kind of learning that makes law school
the beginning, not the end, of a lawyer’s legal education.”157
The continued capacity to learn is critical for lawyers, who
certainly do not graduate from law school or obtain a law license having learned everything necessary to practice competently.158 Both student lawyers and experienced lawyers constantly must learn new areas of legal doctrine and changes to
doctrine previously studied, as well as aspects of non-legal disciplines such as forensic science and business contexts.159 The
ability to self-teach is especially important given that lawyers
often practice with significant independence, and very often in
practice areas not covered in the classroom.160 The capacity for
lifelong learning is viewed by many as a more valuable skill
than the acquisition of doctrinal knowledge or concrete lawyering skills. 161 It is critical for all law students to acquire this skill,
as research suggests that even academic high achievers, such as
those admitted to law school, do not necessarily know how to
learn.162 In fact, some suggest that those with stronger academic
records need the most intensive metacognitive training, since
they may fail less often and thus are less experienced in self-

157. Amsterdam, supra note 124, at 617.
158. “Law is a thirty- or forty-year course of study.” Preston et al., supra note 1, at 1076; see
also, e.g., SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 101, at 173 (“Professional schools cannot directly teach
students to be competent in any and all situations; rather, the essential goal of professional
schools must be to form practitioners who are aware of what it takes to become competent in
their chosen domain and to equip them with the reflective capacity and motivation to pursue
genuine expertise.”).
159. See, e.g., Niedwiecki I, supra note 1, at 153–54.
160. See Grose, supra note 28, at 500–01.
161. See, e.g., Beryl Blaustone, Improving Clinical Judgment in Lawyering with Multidisciplinary
Knowledge About Brain Function and Human Behavior for Effective Lawyering, 40 U. BALT. L. REV.
607, 613 (2011) (discussing how BEST PRACTICES, supra note 102, focuses on self-regulated learning rather than substantive law knowledge); Bloom III, supra note 95, at 118 (commenting that
a “universal” critique is that education focuses on “delivering content” instead of teaching students how to effectively learn).
162. Alleva & Gundlach, supra note 48, at 720.
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reflection and self-improvement.163 Thus, high performers with
weak metacognitive skills might fail when faced with new and
challenging situations, such as when attempting to “learn on
the job,” while those who may not have strong academic records but who have strong metacognitive skills can more successfully meet such challenges.
4. Sound judgment
In addition to developing lifelong learning skills, metacognition builds “good judgment.” Among other things, good judgment enables a lawyer to “grasp[] the point of legal rules and
discern[] the legally and morally salient features of particular
fact situations.”164 While sound judgment can be developed
through extensive life experience,165 it develops more quickly
and more effectively when experience is coupled with metacognitive reflection.166 A long line of academic literature167 supports
the premise that reflection “forces the professional to increase
awareness of the factors that affect judgment” by producing a
“higher level of awareness and consciousness of the decisionmaking process.”168 Accordingly, strengthening students’ legal
judgment and decision-making capacities, especially in the face
of ambiguity, is a central goal of the clinical movement, which
seeks to “guide [students] to recognize choice moments and to
be able to make intentional choices in the face of uncertainty.
Simply put . . . : ‘[I]f we [as clinicians] are not teaching our

163. Anzalone, supra note 13, at 93–94; cf. Frost, supra note 114, at 947–48 (2016) (“Students
who perform well on assessments tend to have stronger metacognitive skills.”).
164. Lawrence B. Solum, Empirical Measures of Judicial Performance: A Tournament of Virtue,
32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1365, 1385 (2005).
165. See, e.g., Lentz, supra note 8, at 22.
166. See Casey, supra note 15, at 318; see also, e.g., Blaustone, supra note 161; D. Don. Welch,
“What’s Going On?” in the Law School Curriculum, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 1607, 1620 (2005) (discussing
the development of judgment through repeated experience, consideration of the full context,
reflection, and other techniques).
167. For a detailed discussion of academic literature focused on reflection, see Casey, supra
note 15.
168. Id. at 321.
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students to recognize other choices, we have failed.’”169 In short,
by asking students to identify factors that might affect legal decision-making, and to intentionally choose the elements appropriate for the context, metacognition teaches students the thinking processes that help to create “good judgment.”170
5. Transfer
Metacognition holds particular promise for legal education
because it strengthens a core legal skill: the ability to transfer
and adapt complex, abstract principles to new contexts.171
Transfer is so fundamental to the enterprise of legal thinking
that clinical educators have deemed it “the heart of clinical pedagogy … [and its] theoretical base.”172 Transfer takes place
when familiar doctrine and skills are applied to facts different
from those addressed by precedent, and when unfamiliar doctrine is learned using legal research and analysis skills previously applied in other contexts. Transfer is what enables lawyers to adapt their advocacy skills to different settings, whether
that setting is an administrative hearing, a negotiation with opposing counsel, or a presentation to a corporate board. A lawyer
must even “argue both sides” so that she can successfully anticipate and defend against counterarguments, requiring her to
169. Grose, supra note 28, at 494–95, 501 (describing one of “the jurisprudential and pedagogical themes of the clinical movement” as the “necessity of making choices about professional
role and behavior” in light of indeterminacy and uncertainty.”). See generally Jane Aiken, Social
Justice Provocateurs, 7 CLINICAL L. REV. 287 (2001) (emphasizing the importance of uncovering
assumptions).
170. See, e.g., Susan D. Bennett, Embracing the Ill-Structured Problem in A Community Economic
Development Clinic, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 45, 62 (2002) (referring to metacognition as useful for
developing the “wisdom” or “equanimity” needed for complex problem solving); R. Michael
Cassidy, Beyond Practical Skills: Nine Steps for Improving Legal Education Now, 53 B.C. L. REV. 1515,
1520–22 (2012) (discussing how problem solving is one of the most important skills for an attorney); Jeffrey M. Lipshaw, The Venn Diagram of Business Lawyering Judgments: Toward a Theory of
Practical Metadisciplinarity, 41 SETON HALL L. REV. 1, 72–73 (2011).
171. Transfer is a “core goal of all instruction,” not just of legal education, but the transfer
of prior knowledge to new contexts is a continual exercise for the legal thinker. See Schwartz II,
supra note 23, at 366; see also Lucille A. Jewel, Old-School Rhetoric and New-School Cognitive Science
the Enduring Power of Logocentric Categories, 13 LEGAL COMM. & RHETORIC: J. ALWD 39, 72 (2016)
(“Adaptive expertise is fueled by a deep-seated metacognitive knowledge.”).
172. Grose, supra note 28, at 494.
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flexibly transfer the same facts and legal principles to support
the opposite conclusion.
Metacognition is known as “the gold standard of transfer
tools”173 for a number of reasons. Metacognition training asks
thinkers to carefully examine the legal skill they are being
taught and to identify its purposes.174 By understanding the
thinking process and what outcomes it is used to achieve, the
thinker can also understand its potential usefulness in other,
disparate settings. The metacognitive thinker is even explicitly
asked, at the beginning of the twelve-step cycle, to assess what
she already knows that might be relevant to the new task at
hand—an exercise that in itself hones the skill of transfer.175 Similarly, it is an act of transfer to intentionally use past experience
to improve future performance under changed circumstances,
which is the very essence of the metacognitive process.176
B. Students Serve as Self-Change Agents
A final reason that the metacognitive process is a revolutionary tool for law teaching is that it explicitly puts the power to
achieve excellence into the students’ own hands.177 By assigning
students a primary role in generating their own intellectual
growth, the metacognitive approach rebuts common assumptions that academic success is primarily determined by forces
beyond a person’s own control, such as innate talent or faculty
caprice.178 Metacognitive theory conveys that students themselves exercise significant control over their own success, which
is fitting, since only the student herself can explore, assess, and
improve the inner workings of her own mind. This premise is
simple but consequential. It not only produces stronger legal

173. Kowalski, supra note 35, at 101; see also Alleva & Gundlach, supra note 48, at 723.
174. See, e.g., Alleva & Gundlach, supra note 48, at 723.
175. Kowalski, supra note 35, at 73 (“Metacognition requires a ‘deliberate effort’ on the part
of students to connect new knowledge to already-familiar concepts.”).
176. See id. at 73–74.
177. See, e.g., Boyle, supra note 48, at 8.
178. See Bloom II, supra note 33, at 319.
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analysis and more well-developed ethical identities, but also
improves motivation, engagement, and mental health.179
A number of learning theories explain why explicitly shifting
power to students results in improved outcomes. The theory of
“self-efficacy,” which is supported by a vast body of academic
literature,180 holds that people perform better when they believe
that their own actions influence their outcomes.181 Self-efficacy
is the opposite of the helpless feeling developed when one believes that one’s intellectual capabilities are limited by nature or
that grading systems are arbitrary.182 Such beliefs may lead students to not even try to improve, since they presume that personal effort will reap no reward. In contrast, those with self-efficacy have confidence that their own actions make a
meaningful difference to their success, which motivates self-action and self-improvement.
Educational theory also suggests that people who experience
“autonomy” have more successful outcomes. Autonomy in this
context means that the learner has personally endorsed a learning technique as important, useful, or otherwise of value to her
personally, rather than adopting the strategy merely because an
external authority has imposed it.183 The metacognitive
179. Id.
180. Studies have specifically linked self-efficacy with better educational outcomes. See
Schwartz I, supra note 1, at 478. See also Usman, supra note 138, at 372 (stating that efficacy is
related to mindset theory, which “holds that one single factor—a student’s belief that intelligence is either fixed or malleable— profoundly affects the student’s ability to learn from failure,
and therefore, in effect, to successfully employ the self-regulated learning cycle”).
181. See Bloom II, supra note 33, at 319.
182. See, e.g., id. at 329 (“The first step toward creating effective self-regulated learners is
convincing my students that they can learn to be self-regulating and control their own learning.”).
183. Paula J. Manning, Understanding the Impact of Inadequate Feedback: A Means to Reduce Law
Student Psychological Distress, Increase Motivation, & Improve Learning Outcomes, 43 CUMB. L. REV.
225, 229–30 (2013) (“Autonomy is different from the concept of independence. Independence
means not relying on or being influenced by external sources, whereas autonomy allows for
external influences so long as those influences are self-endorsed. For instance, a student could
view the action of completing an assignment (which comes from an external source) as either
compliance with an external directive (i.e., because the student was told to do it), which is not
autonomous, or as a means to learn a skill the student believes is important (i.e., because the
student wants to learn how to analyze a legal problem and believes the assignment will help
her do that), which is autonomous.” (citations omitted)).
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approach encourages autonomy by asking students to determine what they need to improve, why, and how. Consequently,
it generates highly personalized feedback, tailored to the individual’s own unique thought processes and learning styles in a
way that only the individual herself can offer.184
Studies indicate that those with self-efficacy and autonomy
perform better than others because of an increased motivation
to act, an increased sense of reward, and deepened personal
connections to the material being taught, among other things.185
These studies comport with law faculty experiments demonstrating that students with a sense of autonomy had higher
grade point averages, greater success on bar examinations, and
more self-generated motivation.186
Qualities such as efficacy and autonomy also improve the
thinker’s mental health, which not only further improves performance but is a good in its own right. Students who understand how to achieve intellectually, and who feel personally
empowered to make such achievement happen, are less likely
to be disconnected, passive, and frustrated, and more likely to
be motivated, enthusiastic, and more deeply engaged in academic endeavors.187 Reported mental health statistics for law
students and lawyers vary, but nearly all are alarming.188 Those
practicing law are reportedly more likely to experience alcoholism, divorce, suicide, and medical problems than the rest of the
general population.189 Those entering law school reportedly experience depression at normal rates of 8-9%, but by graduation
the rate more than quadruples to 40%.190 To the extent that
184. See Kowalski, supra note 35, at 72–74 (explaining that metacognition encourages students to understand their own learning styles).
185. Manning, supra note 183, at 230–31.
186. Id. at 230.
187. See, e.g., Bloom II, supra note 33, at 319, 324-25; Lentz, supra note 8 at 38–39.
188. See, e.g., Debra Austin & Rob Durr, Emotion Regulation for Lawyers: A Mind Is a Challenging Thing to Tame, 16 WYO. L REV 387, 387 (2016); Cathaleen A. Roach, A River Runs Through It:
Tapping into the Informational Stream to Move Students from Isolation to Autonomy, 36 ARIZ. L. REV.
667, 669 (1994); A. Rachel Camp, Creating Space for Silence in Law School Collaborations, 65 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 897, 903–06 (2016).
189. Preston et al., supra note 1, at 1079.
190. Lentz, supra note 8, at 38–39.
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feelings of disempowerment, frustration, and disappointment
in their learning environment contribute to this epidemic, the
metacognitive approach may aid in reversing it.
In short, metacognition offers a path to more effective, more
efficient intellectual growth, with concomitant benefits for emotional well-being. This is a critical offering at this time, when
law schools are performing inadequately, according to various
indicators such as low bar passage rates,191 critiques from employers,192 low enrollment,193 high levels of student depression,194 and low levels of student motivation195 and engagement.196 Certainly, no single silver bullet can solve these
concerns. But the metacognitive process holds powerful promise to reshape legal education in ways that will produce more
competent, healthier legal thinkers with the skills to develop
their own ethical and moral identity, which benefits not only
students, but also clients, employers, faculty, law schools, and
the justice system overall.197
III. METACOGNITIVE THEORY: THE MEANING OF MEANINGFUL
FEEDBACK
The metacognitive approach is already deeply embedded
into some parts of the law curriculum, and its influence continues to spread. Of all of the recent accreditation changes, the
191. Marsha Griggs, Building A Better Bar Exam, 7 TEX. A&M L. REV. 1, 2 (2019).
192. See, e.g., Robert J. Derocher, What’s Going on in Legal Education?, A.B.A. (2012), https:
//www.americanbar.org/groups/bar_services/publications/bar_leader/2011_12/spring/legaled/.
193. Jack Miller, Law Schools Face Diminished Enrollment Numbers, HEIGHTS (Feb. 10, 2019),
https://bcheights.com/2019/02/10/law-schools-face-diminished-enrollment-numbers/.
194. See, e.g., Lentz, supra note 8, at 38–39; Lawrence S. Krieger, Institutional Denial About the
Dark Side of Law School and Fresh Empirical Guidance for Constructively Breaking the Silence, J. LEGAL
EDUC. 112 (2002).
195. See, e.g., Kennon M Sheldon & Lawrence S Krieger, Does Legal Education Have Undermining Effects on Law Students? Evaluating Changes in Motivation, Values, and Well-Being, BEHAV.
SCI. & L., 261 (2004) (describing the mental effects legal education has on law students).
196. LAW SCHOOL SURVEY OF STUDENT ENGAGEMENT, STUDENT ENGAGEMENT IN LAW
SCHOOL: IN CLASS AND BEYOND (2010) http://lssse.indiana.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/01
/2010_LSSSE_Annual_Survey_Results.pdf.
197. See supra notes 13, 15.
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mandate to use “formative assessment with meaningful feedback” throughout the curriculum is the one that will require the
largest number of individual law teachers to start using metacognitive techniques in their classrooms.198 This mandate is
technically very narrow in scope—it requires just one of the
twelve metacognitive steps, namely, student performance of a
task (step 7), and the ABA does not define “meaningful feedback,” which raises the real risk of very weak implementation
by those unfamiliar with how metacognitive concepts are the
driving force behind the mandate. As discussed below, this
omission puts the mandate at risk of failing. Nevertheless, the
mandate is an important milestone in that it creates broad new
opportunities for exploring the most effective way to implement metacognitive theory in legal education. This is critical,
because as the use of these techniques increases, so does the responsibility to ensure that they are used effectively. Implementing the mandate broadly, but poorly, would be highly counterproductive and would cause professional, institutional, and
personal damage by failing to significantly increase professional competencies, while at the same time squandering faculty and institutional resources and reinforcing students’ feelings of helplessness, defeatism, and disengagement by
promising positive results but not delivering them.
It is thus imperative to critically examine metacognitive theory for vulnerabilities and to refine it so that the formative assessment mandate is more likely to be properly implemented.
This is especially important given how narrow the mandate is;
since such a small slice of the metacognitive approach is mandated, that slice must be implemented very effectively if educational benefits are to result. This section therefore seeks to address an important vulnerability that could thwart the success
of the formative assessment mandate: the vagueness of the concept of “meaningful feedback.” Since the mandate was proposed, a flurry of literature has discussed many productive
ideas of what good feedback looks like, especially in the context
198. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
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of a traditional midterm exam and an accompanying model answer, which is a common means of meeting the formative assessment mandate due to its familiarity and perceived efficiency. 199 This literature and its focus on techniques for
providing better feedback is valuable and necessary. At the
same time, however, this article argues that a broader theory of
what constitutes “meaningful feedback” is needed, and it derives this theory from the metacognitive approach as the underlying basis for the mandate itself.
This article proposes a conceptual vision of what constitutes
improved feedback. This vision has two parts. The first explains
why the common technique of a midterm-with-a-model-answer will not fulfill the meaningful-feedback mandate and proposes a framework for choosing feedback strategies that will.
Second, it proposes that most feedback will also become inherently more meaningful if faculty first engage in the deconstruction and abstraction, or “naming,” of the legal thinking processes or techniques that they want students to master. As
discussed below, the use of “naming” as a crucial step in the
metacognitive process is supported by experts in many realms,
including clinical educators, “transfer” theory experts, and
those who employ the metacognitive approach in non-clinical
courses.200
Ultimately, this article claims that the question to “how
should law schools implement the formative assessment mandate?” is not simply “by providing midterms with more modelanswer feedback.” Rather, it argues that feedback techniques
must be specifically selected with particular metacognitive
goals in mind. In addition, it proposes that one of the most valuable tools for creating “meaningful feedback” is not in fact a
199. See, e.g., Sargent & Curcio, supra note 9, at 379–85.
200. See infra Sections III.B.3–III.B.4. It is worth noting that metacognition literature often
focuses on what students do, rather than on what teachers do. This feels appropriate since the
metacognitive approach strongly emphasizes active student participation in their own learning
processes. However, this may also cause the literature to fall short on explaining what teachers
must do in order to successfully enable metacognitive learning. This may be a reason that metacognitive experts often engage in “naming” in practice without highlighting it as a critical part
of their teaching strategy.
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feedback technique at all, but the act of “naming,” which helps
students conceptualize what they are meant to be learning in
the first place.
A. The Meaning of “Meaningful Feedback”
The formative assessment mandate has spurred an energetic
and thoughtful discussion on how to best implement it, especially in the context of midterm essay exams with model answers. This is presumed to be the technique of choice for many
faculty, yet it is also known to be largely ineffective, since students often have difficulty properly assessing whether and how
their own work is different from model. Why do model answers
so often fail to help students? Studies show that while model
answers are appropriate for testing information recall, identifying concepts, and very simple problem-solving,201 they are of
limited value where students must learn higher-order thinking
skills.202 The reason is that models merely demonstrate what
successful performance generally looks like, but do not convey
how a student can actually use this information to assess and
improve their own work; for instance, models do not communicate the complex analytical processes necessary to produce the
work; do not articulate what specific qualities make the model
successful or unsuccessful, or why those qualities are important; and do not explain why other approaches, including
the approach taken by the student herself, are flawed.203 Thus, a
student must divine on her own what lessons to draw from the
model, how those lessons apply to her own work, and how to
create strategies to correct her flaws.204 In other words, a student
must already have relatively strong cognitive and metacognitive skills205 to benefit from a model answer. For these reasons,

201.
202.
203.
204.
205.

Frost, supra note 114, at 946–47.
Id. at 957; Sargent & Curcio, supra note 9, at 381–82.
Frost, supra note 114, at 958–59; see also Sargent & Curcio, supra note 9, at 381–82
See Frost, supra note 114, at 940.
See id. at 941.
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model answers only are effective for a relatively small subset of
students.
Metacognitive theory clarifies why the usefulness of model
answers is limited. A midterm with a model answer only supports two of the twelve metacognitive steps: performance of a
task (the exam itself, step 7) and the gathering of indicators of
how well the student performed (the model answer, step 8). But
when model answers are simply handed out, what is missing
entirely is support for the crucial next steps of the metacognitive
process: the student’s identification of the specific characteristics that make the model successful or not (step 9), her evaluation of whether her own performance has those characteristics
(step 10), her understanding of what thinking or behavior led
her to perform poorly (step 11), and her identification of strategies to correct herself next time (step 12). These steps 9 through
12 are the heart of what makes feedback “meaningful,” because
they are the mental activities that enable a student to move from
merely receiving information to actually using that feedback to
change her work-product. In other words, feedback takes on
meaning only when students actively engage in these additional mental processes. Yet these mental processes cannot be
expected to simply happen on their own. They must be encouraged through enhanced feedback techniques deliberately designed and chosen to support students throughout these specific mental steps.
This hypothesis is supported by the fact that enhanced-feedback techniques recommended by experts generally do support
specific steps in the metacognitive process. For example, one
recommendation is to augment a model answer with a detailed
explanation as to how exactly the model answer demonstrates
competency,206 such as by explaining very explicitly how the
model successfully explained or applied the law (for example,
by focusing on its organizational, analytical, and mechanical

206. Frost, supra note 114, at 958.
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qualities).207 Another is to identify and analyze the most common student mistakes through in-class discussion. Both of these
techniques support metacognitive step 9 by helping students
identify the specific characteristics of a successful and unsuccessful performance. Thus, even those who use model answers,
instead of using the gold-standard form of highly individualized and personalized feedback, can find excellent techniques,
recommended in existing literature, that supports specific mental steps within the metacognitive process and thus should increase the success of the model-answer process.208
However, it is important to acknowledge that both of the
model-answer techniques just discussed support only one specific metacognitive step—step 9—and do not help students in
the next step, which requires them to evaluate whether the characteristics of success and non-success are actually present in
their own work. This lack of support for step 10 means that students who are unable to complete step 10 on their own will be
unable to complete the rest of the metacognitive process, and
thus be unable to improve their outcomes. In short, the lack of
support for a single step in the process may cause the entire process to fail.
Therefore, even where numerous recommended feedback
techniques are employed—such as a graded midterm (which
supports step 8) combined with an explanation of the strengths
of the model answer and common weaknesses in students
(which support step 9)—many students may still not benefit.
Thus, the goal should not be to simply to use a miscellaneous
assortment of feedback techniques; rather, educators must
choose techniques that specifically support each of the three
metacognitive steps (steps 8, 9, and 10) necessary for a student
to improve, that is, the feedback must support step 8 by indicating to the student what level of success her performance
207. Sargent & Curcio, supra note 9, at 381–82. Other techniques may include restating the
original course material from which the answer was drawn and offering concrete ideas to students on how to improve performance next time. Id.
208. See, e.g., SHAW & VANZANDT, supra note 100, at 6.
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achieved, support step 9 by helping her understand what specific performance characteristics or traits demonstrate success,
and which do not, and support step 10 by helping her to identify whether and how those characteristics are present in her
own work product.
Feedback that supports these three steps, in turn, enables the
student to conduct the two final steps of the process: the very
personalized, internal examination of what caused the student
to perform as she did, and what interventions are needed to improve her performance next time (steps 11 and 12). These final
steps require the student to examine what intellectual and behavioral choices led her to produce imperfect work, and requires her to change those things about herself so that she can
avoid those pitfalls in the future. The student herself is primarily responsible for this work, since only she is in the position to
both understand and alter her own thoughts and actions. It is
critical, however, for faculty to encourage students to complete
these steps of the metacognitive process and to find ways to
support them in this mental work. For example, reflective questions may help focus student attention on these final steps, as
might a discussion of possible ways to correct common analytical mistakes.
In sum, since the midterm-with-model-answer approach
touches upon only two of the metacognitive steps, in order for
it to succeed with a broad range of students, it must be augmented with carefully selected feedback techniques that support each of the other steps of the metacognitive process. Moreover, educators must remember that while students necessarily
must do much of the metacognitive work themselves, faculty
are responsible for providing enough support and guidance to
enable the students to do this work.209
This hypothesis applies not only to midterms with model answers, but also to other kinds of formative assessments. Fortunately, existing literature provides a rich array of both
209. See, e.g., SCHWARTZ III, supra note 61, at 239; Alleva & Gundlach, supra note 48, at 733–
34; Warren, supra note 115, at 99.
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formative assessment methods and feedback techniques from
which to choose. Assessors should therefore choose assessment
and feedback methods that specifically support student engagement in metacognitive steps 8 to 12, since these steps are what
put feedback into action and create “meaning” in terms of
measurable improvement in the students’ competency. If feedback methods do not support these crucial steps of the metacognitive process, the formative assessment mandate is very
likely to fail in its goals.
B. “Naming” Creates Meaning for Feedback
The prior discussion is focused on the post-performance (e.g.,
post-exam) provision of feedback. This section offers a second
new conceptualization of “meaningful feedback,” which is focused on pre-performance activity, specifically, the pre-performance activity of “naming,” or the deconstruction and abstraction of legal thinking processes. It argues that pre-performance
“naming” creates context and meaning for post-performance
feedback, making that feedback inherently more efficient and
effective.
The starting premise here is that performance comes at a relatively late stage in the metacognitive process (step 7 of 12
steps). It is clear that every metacognitive step builds on each
of the prior steps, that is, the success of any step depends on
whether the preceding steps were taken in the right direction.
It follows that to strengthen self-evaluation and self-improvement skills—the last steps in the metacognitive process—educators must improve not just the quality of feedback itself, but
must also strengthen the foundation laid in earlier steps of the
metacognitive process. Viewed from this perspective, the central question shifts from “how do educators provide more
meaningful feedback, post-performance?” to “what must educators do pre-performance in order to equip students to productively use that feedback?”
The metacognitive process itself sheds light on the answer.
The very first step in the metacognitive process requires the
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student to define the learning goal.210 It is apparent that if the
learning goal is poorly understood at the outset, all of the following steps in the metacognitive process will likewise be misguided: the student will choose inappropriate resources and
strategies for achieving that goal (steps 2-6), perform poorly
since she does not know what she is meant to be doing (step 7),
misidentify the characteristics that demonstrate that the learning goal has been met (step 9), and so forth.211 In short, it is eminently understandable why a student who does not clearly understand the learning goals in the first place would find it very
difficult to effectively use a model-answer or otherwise engage
in productive metacognitive learning.
Accordingly, focusing solely on improving the quality of
post-performance feedback takes a too-narrow view of both the
problem and the solution. While better feedback is important
and necessary, feedback itself can be made much more effective
through the clearer definition of learning goals up front, so that
students have a more accurate understanding from the beginning of what they should aim to accomplish and of what the
feedback will ultimately be focused on.212
210. See supra Section I.A.
211. See Fruehwald, supra note 8, at 108 (“The most important part of helping students develop metacognitive skills in the classroom is for the professor to set clear goals for the class.”).
212. See infra Section III.B.4. The importance of articulating clear metacognitive goals is echoed by the extensive literature on articulating clear learning outcomes, although metacognitive
learning goals may not be precisely the same as the official learning outcomes. Learning outcomes can be developed at an institutional level for the curriculum as a whole, for a specific
course, and for individual assessments (such as a midterm exam); performance standards are
commonly used to measure whether learning outcomes are achieved. See, e.g., SHAW &
VANZANDT, supra note 100, at 18, 27, 36, 76–77; Janet W. Fisher, Putting Students at the Center of
Legal Education: How an Emphasis on Outcome Measures in the ABA Standards for Approval of Law
Schools Might Transform the Educational Experience of Law Students, 35 S. ILL. U.L.J. 225, 235–37,
242 (2011); Lori A. Roberts, Assessing Ourselves: Confirming Assumptions and Improving Student
Learning by Efficiently and Fearlessly Assessing Student Learning Outcomes, 3 DREXEL L. REV. 457,
474–75 (2011); Marie Summerlin Hamm et al., The Rubric Meets the Road in Law Schools: Program
Assessment of Student Learning Outcomes as a Fundamental Way for Law Schools to Improve and Fulfill Their Respective Missions, 95 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 343, 375 (2018). Metacognitive learning
goals may or may not be the same as the course’s learning outcomes or performance standards.
They should, however, refer to specific cognitive process that the students are meant to master.
See infra Section III. B (discussing the importance of deconstructing lawyerly thinking processes
into subcomponent parts). Moreover, while learning outcomes may focus on static knowledge
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If proper goal definition is critical to accurate self-evaluation
and to the overall success of the metacognitive approach, what
does goal definition look like in the context of law teaching? A
specific technique for achieving such clarity in defining learning goals is referred to here as “naming.” Naming requires faculty to deconstruct lawyerly thinking processes into their component subparts, and to abstract those subparts and assign
them names or labels. “Naming” is used by clinicians, transfer
theorists, and by nonclinical metacognition experts, as discussed in detail below. That naming is used in many different
realms of the metacognitive revolution supports the hypothesis
that it is important to the process, can be useful in defining the
meaning of “meaningful feedback,” and should be given a new
place of primacy within nonclinical metacognitive theory.
1. Deconstruction, abstraction, and “naming” in clinical theory and
practice
The importance of deconstructing, abstracting, and “naming”
the subcomponent parts of legal thinking is most clearly set
forth in writings by clinical theorists. A primary goal of clinical
educators, for example, is to “map out the lawyering process
into its component parts and then to propose ideas and theories
about what constitutes high-quality performance of each
one.”213 Deconstruction and analysis of the components of lawyerly thinking is viewed as one of the three principle tenets of
or work product, metacognitive goals should focus on underlying thinking processes rather than
on the end-products of that thinking. For example, a learning outcome focused on an end-product might be to “articulate the elements of burglary” or “produce a research memorandum,”
while the associated metacognitive goal focused on the underlying thinking process would be
to “apply specific cognitive techniques for recalling the elements of a legal test” or “prioritize
initial legal research by relevancy and significance.” See, e.g., Niedwiecki I, supra note 1, at 152
(noting metacognition focuses on processes, not product). Once the metacognitive learning
goals are adequately defined by faculty, students can then design appropriate personal subgoals, which should be “concrete, short-term, challenging, and realistic,” such as, ‘By the end
of the 1st day of class I will be able to classify a task with X percent of accuracy.” See SCHWARTZ
III, supra note 61, at 44.
213. Robert D. Dinerstein & Elliott S. Milstein, Learning to Be a Lawyer: Embracing Uncertainty,
Indeterminacy, and the Clinical Curriculum, in TRANSFORMING THE EDUCATION OF LAWYERS: THE
THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CLINICAL PEDAGOGY 327, 341 (Susan Bryant et al., eds., 2014).
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clinical pedagogy,214 with the underlying idea being to take a
broad lawyering concept, such as “client-centered service” or
“effective advocacy,” and deconstruct it into its component subparts, allowing each part to be meaningfully examined, studied,
practiced, and improved.215
As thinking processes are deconstructed, the newly-identified ideas and concepts are given a label or name,216
so that they are clearly identified for later use.
Naming involves giving students frameworks
. . . . [A] failure to “name” may result in the student knowing how to do a specific task but not
how to translate the lesson to other similar tasks.
Naming also serves to create a shared vocabulary
for the teachers and students to use during the
clinic and for the student to use as he or she develops into a professional.217
According to Professor Carolyn Grose, naming is “at the
heart” of clinical methodology in part because it helps lawyers
“understand what we do and why we do it. We give names to
things in order to make them exist and capable of analysis.” 218
The act of naming thus involves abstracting or generalizing a
concept, creating a shared understanding and vocabulary, so
that the concept can be discussed and analyzed. A concept that
arises within one specific factual context is transferred into a
generalized or abstracted concept, with a unique name, so that
214. Id. at 496–97. Ever since the early days of clinical scholarship, clinicians have engaged
in identifying, or naming, what, exactly, a lawyer does.
215. See id. at 497.
216. See id. at 500–01.
217. Wallace J. Mlyniec, Where to Begin? Training New Teachers in the Art of Clinical Pedagogy,
18 CLINICAL L. REV. 505, 521 (2012) (footnote omitted). Naming is so fundamental to clinical
theory and practice that scholars have suggested that when designing a teaching intervention,
clinical teachers themselves begin by naming the situation that inspired the teaching opportunity. See Colleen F. Shanahan & Emily A. Benfer, Adaptive Clinical Teaching, 19 CLINICAL L.
REV. 517, 527 (2013). For a similar use of metacognition by non-experiential faculty, see Filippa
Marullo Anzalone, It All Begins with You: Improving Law School Learning Through Professional SelfAwareness and Critical Reflection, 24 HAMLINE L. REV. 324 (2001).
218. Grose, supra note 28, at 501.
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it that can be referred to, analyzed, applied, and modified in
other contexts. 219 Clinicians use naming to identify learning
goals for students, since only after goals are named can students
knowingly grapple with them and work productively towards
achieving them.
2. Deconstruction and abstraction in learning theory
The idea that learning is facilitated by deconstruction, or the
breaking down of complex processes into smaller, more discrete steps, is also supported by learning theory. Professor Barbara Lentz likens the process of learning how to engage in legal
thinking to the process of learning how to perform a basketball
free throw, and explains how a basketball novice must at first
focus her attention separately on each discrete sub-step in the
overall process of performing a free throw, and that only after
repeated practice and reflection on the individual sub steps can
she then begin to combine those sub-steps into a more cohesive,
seamless performance.220 This need to deconstruct expert
knowledge into component subparts to make it graspable by a
novice strongly correlates to the mapping of lawyering processes done by clinical faculty with their students.
The deconstruction of lawyerly thought processes into component subparts is also consistent with recommendations from
the field of instructional design, the profession devoted to the
creation of effective teaching methodologies.221 As Professor
Schwartz states, “[i]nstructional designers perform an
219. Deconstruction, abstraction, and naming are also critical to a broader goal of clinical
teaching, which is to present theoretical frameworks for lawyering and for the lawyer’s role and
responsibilities within society. See id., at 500–01. Focusing on articulating different theories of
lawyering “brings into consciousness the often inchoate, pre-conscious theories and principles
by which the student is operating. Only by bringing into consciousness and making explicit
those theories that underlie action can the student observe, evaluate, and improve them.” Phyllis Goldfarb, A Theory-Practice Spiral: The Ethics of Feminism and Clinical Education, 75 MINN. L.
REV. 1599, 1650 (1991).
220. See Lentz, supra note 8.
221. See, e.g., Schwartz II, supra note 23, at 383–84 (“Instructional design is a reflective, systematic, and comprehensive approach to creating instruction.”); Instructional Design Definitions,
INDUSTRIAL DESIGN CENTRAL, https://www.instructionaldesigncentral.com/whatisinstructionaldesign (last visited Jan. 25, 2020).
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information-processing analysis of a goal to ‘decompose’ the
goal into the mental steps a person must go through to perform
it,” thus “seek[ing] to identify and sequence all the mental steps
involved in achieving the learning goal.”222
Transfer theory further supports the abstraction or generalization of mental processes as key to learning how to transfer
knowledge from one situation to another. Generalization enables students to recognize and apply a concept even when it
arises in a different, unfamiliar context. Professor Kowalski emphasizes
the importance of the need to generalize learning in order to apply it in new contexts. Charles
Judd pointed out that transfer occurs “by way of
understanding the abstract general principle underlying a phenomenon which can then be applied to situations that do not possess obvious
identical elements.” . . . [Generalization means
that] ‘understanding is transposable to a wider
range of situations’ . . . [and] identifies meaning as
an important cohesive force, whose presence is
necessary to the comprehension and adaptability
of general principles.223
Thus, both deconstruction and abstraction are emphasized by
general learning theory, instructional designers, and transfer
theory in ways that strongly echo the clinical technique of naming.
3. Deconstruction, abstraction, and “naming” in nonclinical
metacognitive theory and practice
Like clinical theory and transfer theory, nonclinical metacognitive theory and practice also demonstrate the importance of
faculty clearly articulating for students the legal thinking and
reasoning process that they want students to learn. Nonclinical
222. Schwartz II, supra note 23, at 398.
223. Kowalski, supra note 35, at 70.
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writings do not use the term “naming,” although nonclinical
metacognition experts are clearly engaged in naming in their
classrooms in much the same way that clinical experts are. This
section first discusses nonclinical theory, which clearly supports the concept of “naming” even though it does not use that
term. It then turns to nonclinical practice, which is relatively advanced in terms of naming.
The concept in nonclinical literature that is most closely related to deconstruction is “modeling,” which is sometimes also
referred to as engaging in cognitive “thinking aloud.”224 Modeling is when an expert describes to students her “inner monologue,” demonstrating her intellectual process step-by-step “by
stating out loud every thought with respect to the problem being solved, seeking to provide students with a rough information-processing demonstration.”225 “The ultimate goal is to
slow down what normally is instantaneous analysis for the expert metacognitive thinker” by “freezing the frames at critical
steps along the chain of reasoning.”226 Demonstrating in detail
how the expert’s thought process progresses is meant to assist
the student in understanding the discrete sub-steps that lead
the thinker to her final conclusion, and to enable the student to
engage in those sub-steps herself.227
Modeling thus incorporates the concept of deconstruction.228
Some explicit references to deconstruction also exist in the nonclinical literature, although these are merely references made in
passing.229 The concept of modeling itself is not fully developed
224. See Schwartz II, supra note 23, at 415.
225. Id. at 415–16; Schwartz I, supra note 1, at 491, 503–04; see also Alleva & Gundlach, supra
note 48, at 729–31; Kowalski, supra note 35, at 98–99.
226. Alleva & Gundlach, supra note 48, at 731–32.
227. For an example of modeling, see id. at 730–31 (providing an example designed to counter the common misunderstanding that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are “black-letter
law” that can only be interpreted in one way).
228. Schwartz II, supra note 23, at 398.
229. See, e.g., Fruehwald, supra note 8, at 110 (“Part of being explicit in teaching [metacognition] is breaking down complex tasks into component skills (unpacking). While experts can
often see how the parts fit together, novices often need help with unpacking.”); Bloom II, supra
note 33, at 332 (“I attempt to break down the overall goals of improved academic performance
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or explored, however, except in the work of Professor Michael
Hunter Schwartz,230 and it is not often prioritized as a component of nonclinical metacognitive theory in law teaching. 231 This
might suggest that modeling, and the associated concepts of deconstruction, abstraction, and naming of legal thinking processes, are unimportant to nonclinical metacognition experts.
However, what these experts actually do in the classroom suggests the opposite. The literature reveals that nonclinical metacognitivists are, in fact, already intensely engaged in the project
of deconstructing, abstracting, and naming the many different
intellectual processes involved in “thinking like a lawyer.”
into small manageable steps. I find this strategy not only helps my students regulate their behavior but also facilitates their self-regulation of motivation.”).
230. Experts acknowledge that proper modeling is extremely difficult to perform because
faculty are very likely to perform certain mental processes without conscious effort, and therefore casual attempts at modeling are highly likely to omit crucial steps. Fruehwald, supra, note
8, at 109. Professor Schwartz appears to be the only legal scholar deeply engaged in exploring
the problems of modeling and possible solutions. He suggests that one possible way to prevent
incomplete modeling is to have a second expert actively question the faculty member as she
models, so that she is encouraged to explain fully her thought process. Schwartz I, supra note 1,
at 490. Another strategy he suggests is to undertake a comprehensive process of interviewing
multiple experts, posing various hypotheticals, and mapping out expert responses with detail
and care, in order to create a complete model. Schwartz II, supra note 23, at 398. Unfortunately,
Professor Schwartz found no documentation that educators have engaged in these best practices, nor that any legal scholar had attempted to deconstruct the intellectual sub-steps required
to analyze a problem within their specific doctrinal subject matter. Id. at 398. Schwartz himself
appears to be the exception, as he provides an example of deconstruction of the contract law
principle of illusory promise. Id. at 399–401; see infra Section III.B.4 (explaining that the practice
of metacognition is much more well-developed than the theory with respect to deconstruction).
231. Why are deconstruction and abstraction largely absent in this body of work? It may be
because while legal scholars have long attempted to articulate the thinking processes involved
in legal analysis, see, e.g., Steven I. Friedland, How We Teach: A Survey of Teaching Techniques in
American Law Schools, 20 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1, 22–23 (1996); Sanford Levinson, Taking Law Seriously: Reflections on “Thinking Like A Lawyer,” 30 STAN. L. REV. 1071, 1072–74 (1978), many have
pointed out the difficulty, and perhaps impossibility, of defining what it means “to think like a
lawyer.” See, e.g., Preston et al., supra note 1, at 1054 (“For decades, scholars have groaned under
the weight of trying to describe what ‘thinking like a lawyer’ means.”); Edwards, supra note 12,
at 218 (“Teaching students to ‘think like lawyers’ is too vague to pass muster as an appropriate
mission. Most law schools have not examined what lawyers do, much less what they think, how
they think, and whether legal thinking is any different than critical thinking in any other discipline.” (quoting GREGORY S. MUNRO, OUTCOMES ASSESSMENT FOR LAW SCHOOLS 49 (2000)));
Kurt M. Saunders & Linda Levine, Learning to Think Like A Lawyer, 29 U.S.F.L. REV. 121, 121–22
(1994) (“There has been much debate as to exactly what thinking like a lawyer involves and
how to best teach this process. . . . As yet, legal educators have not decided if and how thinking
like a lawyer differs from thinking like an engineer, a physician, or a writer.”).
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One example is Professor Schwartz’s text for incoming firstyear students, which breaks down many foundational legal
thinking skills into discrete sub-steps—identifying, for example, a precise four-step procedure for “applying rules to facts,”
and further identifying relevant subskills, such as the “ability to
draw inferences from facts.”232 Other metacognition experts
suggest that fundamental legal skills may include how to use
authoritative interpretations of a rule to assess the validity of
one’s legal hypothesis,233 how to assess whether a given fact is
relevant,234 and how and when to use inductive, deductive, or
other forms of reasoning.235 Professor Bloom refers to identifying the use of “different tools for analysis (such as rule-based,
analogy-based, and policy-based),” because “[o]nce [students]
are able to identify and articulate the specific components of
successful writing, they are able to take the next step of using
these tools in their own analysis.”236 Another technique used by
Professor Bloom is to ask students to engage in a “cognitive
think-aloud,” which enables Professor Bloom to identify and
deconstruct the student’s thinking patterns, and further helps
her to teach the student how to do that deconstruction work
herself.237
A particularly comprehensive effort at deconstruction and
abstraction is offered by Professor Kowalski, who offers a curriculum-wide map of skills commonly used in legal thinking,
and maps how these processes may appear in different contexts
within legal education and legal practice.238 Specifically, Professor Kowalski names four categories of “core lawyering skills in
232. SCHWARTZ III, supra note 61, at 211, 215–20.
233. See Alleva & Gundlach, supra note 48, at 730.
234. See Niedwiecki II, supra note 11, at 59–60.
235. Id. at 58.
236. Bloom II, supra note 33, at 341.
237. Id. at 342. Professor Jennifer Cooper illustrates another example of “naming” cognitive
techniques with her reference to different methods of reading, such as skimming, scanning,
questioning, rephrasing, and connecting “new information to prior knowledge.” Jennifer M.
Cooper, Smarter Law Learning: Using Cognitive Science to Maximize Law Learning, 44 CAP. U.L.
REV. 551, 583 (2016).
238. Kowalski, supra note 35, at 55–56.
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their fixed, abstract forms”: formal legal analysis, advocacy,
critical thinking, and professionalism,239 which categories in
turn encompass many more specific skills, such as “[a]ddressing counter arguments,” “[a]rguing in the alternative,”
“[a]sserting narrative and other human and emotional elements,” “[q]uestioning the motives and policies behind laws
and decisions,” and so on.240
These examples both demonstrate that metacognition scholars deeply value deconstruction and abstraction, and illustrate
the impressive and serious work that they are doing in naming
the key components of the lawyerly thinking process. Unfortunately, this important work is largely overlooked in the scholarly literature. While educator-scholars are already engaged in
this work of their own accord, it is not afforded a place of primacy in discussions of nonclinical metacognitive theory, and its
centrality to success of the metacognitive process is frequently
overlooked.
Appropriate recognition of this work, however, is critically
important. Just as naming enables clinical students to engage in
metacognitive learning, the deconstruction and abstraction of
lawyering thinking processes in nonclinical education enables
students to metacognitively grapple with those thinking processes. This in turn is crucial to the success of the mandate to
implement formative assessment with meaningful feedback. In
short, the naming of learning goals at the outset enables students to understand what they are striving towards, and to understand what feedback is meant to help them accomplish.
Naming is thus a fundamental precursor to meaningful feedback, and thus is fundamental to the project of formative assessment itself.

239. Id.
240. Id. at 96.
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CONCLUSION
Metacognitive thinking is today integrated into the legal curriculum more broadly and deeply than previously recognized.
Further expansion of metacognitive principles into the curriculum is inevitable, given the accreditation mandate to implement
formative assessment with meaningful feedback across the curriculum. While this creates opportunities for great benefit, if the
metacognitive approach is not properly implemented it also
poses a real threat of harm to institutions, students, and the profession. This Article has sought to define ways to prevent this
harm, and to maximize the benefits of metacognition, by first
recognizing the many different components of the metacognitive revolution as intrinsically related to each other, and then by
examining them to point to what must be done to effectively
implement the meaningful-feedback mandate. It posits that
feedback techniques must be chosen with the deliberate goal of
helping students complete the final steps of the metacognitive
cycle. It further argues that nonclinical metacognitive theory
should newly emphasize the naming of legal thinking processes
as fundamental to the theory’s practical success. Doing so will
bring to the forefront the impressive work already being done
with respect to naming, which in turn will greatly increase the
effectiveness of the formative assessment mandate.
As law schools design their futures, institutions must now
recognize and embrace the metacognitive revolution and its
promise, along with its challenges. Drawing on the experiences
and expertise that exists across all components of the revolution
reveals common principles and methodologies and suggests
how its theoretical framework must be revised in order to maximize its benefits.

